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Abstract 
 
This research used systems architecture to develop a model that determined the effect of 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) on mission success rates for unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS). To evaluate this effect, a simulation model was developed and 
used to analyze the difference between mission success rates for a theoretical UAS with 
and without ISHM. Design of Experiments analysis techniques were used to map a 
response surface that modeled the difference between mission success rates calculated for 
current health management technology and ISHM. Using representative data for a UAS, 
the analysis determined that the failure distribution parameters, sensor quality (which 
determines the relationship between probability of detection and probability of false 
alarm), and probability of an imminent fault during a mission were significant to the 
model. The result of the model determined that ISHM can result in a significant 
improvement on mission assurance, especially when implemented with higher quality 
sensors and on vehicles where the probability of imminent failure is higher relative to the 
mission times and time between preventative maintenance.  This appears consistent with 
the premise that ISHM can support an extension of preventative maintenance intervals 
with an attendant reduction in sustainment cost. 
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EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATED SYSTEM HEALTH 
MANAGEMENT ON MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In 2010, the United States Air Force (USAF) released the results of a year-long study 
highlighting the need for increasing autonomy in modern weapon systems, especially in 
the domain of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The study identified the need for greater 
system autonomy as the “single greatest theme” for future USAF Science and 
Technology investments [Dahm, 2010]. Current technology advancements have brought 
the USAF to a state of flexible autonomy, which involves dynamically shifting command 
and control (C2) from autonomous to operator based on workload, system health, and the 
perceived intent of the operator. 
 
One of the key attributes sustaining flexible autonomy is the ability of the UAS to self-
detect, isolate, and diagnose system health problems. Current flight avionics architectures 
may include lower level sub-system health monitoring or may isolate health monitoring 
functions to a black box configuration, but a vehicle-wide health monitoring information 
system has seldom been implemented. A new area of research, Integrated System Health 
Management (ISHM), adds a centralized health management system that is responsible 
for collecting and processing vehicle health status information from across the vehicle 
during all mission phases. ISHM balances data flow from multiple sub-systems and 
produces the information necessary to identify current vehicle capabilities, provide 
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situational awareness to mission and ground operations, and quickly identify 
contingencies for improved vehicle control and mission decisions.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although reliability has improved since the last official UAS reliability study, the 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study commissioned by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense in 2003, significant problems still plague the overall health of the systems. 
Current statistics on the loss rate per 100,000 flight hours of several unmanned systems 
are compared with various manned military aircraft in Table 1. The UAS loss rates are 
magnitudes above the manned aircraft, although some UAS platforms have not yet 
reached 100,000 lifetime flight hours. 
Table 1 - Class A Mishap Rates per 100,000 Flight Hours [AF Safety Center, 2012] 
UAS 
Mishap Rate Per 
100K Hours 
Manned 
Aircraft 
Mishap Rate Per 
100K Hours 
Predator 7.69 F-16 3.58 
Global Hawk* 11.37 B-52 1.29 
Reaper 6.37 C-5 1.04 
* Has not reached 100k flight hours C-130 0.83 
 
The dominant causes of these UAS mishaps are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 - Causes of [UAS] Mishaps [OUSDATL, 2004] 
[UAS] Mishap Cause Percent 
Power and Propulsion 37% 
Flight Controls 25% 
Human Error 17% 
Communications 11% 
Miscellaneous 10% 
 
The two mishap causes where there can be an assumption made that the current health 
management or monitoring system did not adequately detect an imminent failure are 
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Power and Propulsion and Flight Controls, which amount to 62% of total mishap causes. 
Granted, even a theoretically ideal health management system cannot account for every 
fault or failure cause, but vast improvements need to be made in fault detection systems. 
 
There is also cause for concern on the maintenance side of health management. Even 
when a fault is detected pervasive “Could Not Duplicate” (CND) and “No Defect Found” 
(NDF) maintenance results show that improvement in fault isolation is needed. In 1999, 
an average of nine CND and 47 NDF maintenance results were recorded per aircraft 
[Stoll, 2000].  
 
 ISHM may be one answer to these health management problems, both on the aircraft and 
in the maintenance and logistics side of operations. Previous research efforts have 
focused solely on quantifying the cost or performance benefits provided by ISHM, but 
few have looked into the effect of ISHM on operational effectiveness. This research 
effort intends to give decision makers a better understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of ISHM by adding the mission environment to previously built cost and 
performance analyses. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
The focus of this research is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by 
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any 
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture will include the ability to analyze 
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the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the performance of the 
necessary algorithms, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring sensors) to 
mission performance. The research presented in this thesis is aimed at primarily 
answering the following questions using the architecture in a modeling and simulation 
context: 
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users? 
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices? 
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect 
mission success? 
 
In order to answer these research questions and develop an appropriate model, a literature 
review should first be conducted to answer these questions: 
 (1) What is the current status of UAS health management? 
 (2) What are the essential elements of ISHM? 
 (3) What are the expected benefits of ISHM? 
 
The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions: 
(1) How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the 
presentation change in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators, 
maintenance, etc.)?  
 (2) Is ISHM cost effective? 
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1.4 Methodology 
The development of the analytic architecture simulating ISHM over the lifetime of the 
UAS will follow the eight-step Architecture Based Evaluation Process and be in 
accordance with the Department of Defense Architecture Framework [DoD, 2012]. This 
process was developed by a group of AFIT graduate students in 2006 to bridge the gap 
between the system engineering architecture community and the modeling and simulation 
community [Dietrichs, 2006]. The analytic architecture will model expected mission 
success rates and maintenance actions for a UAS, both with and without ISHM for 
statistical comparison.  
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations 
In order to make a general baseline model, it is not possible to represent every possible 
aspect of ISHM; therefore, there are several limitations to this research:  
(1) This architecture does not analyze ISHM past the system level; however, the 
architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems 
that are of value to the researcher. 
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or 
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state 
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The 
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as 
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or 
direct mitigation actions as necessary. 
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1.6 Implications 
An ideal ISHM would have several major benefits over current maintenance and tasking 
practices. By having a real-time autonomous capability to detect, isolate, and diagnose 
problems, the largest direct benefits include a reduction in maintenance time, a larger 
operational flight envelope, and the ability to enable e collaborative mission re-planning 
based on current system capability and health. Overall, ISHM would improve mission 
decision making, enable condition-based maintenance and provide remaining life 
quantification while reducing current conservative design life margins and/or inspection 
intervals. Planned Near Term, Mid Term, and Far Term future capabilities of ISHM are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - Future ISHM Capabilities [Derriso, 2011] 
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1.7 Preview 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter discusses ISHM 
considerations in terms of technical standards and through the system architectural 
definition. The remaining chapters are as follows: 
 Chapter II examines and classifies the current state of health management 
for unmanned aerial systems, provides an ISHM system taxonomy, and 
summarizes the major areas of research currently being performed. 
 Chapter III describes the research methodology and introduces the 
architectural development process used to conduct the research. 
 Chapter IV presents a proposed prototypical ISHM architecture and 
provides analysis of the analytic architecture. 
 Chapter V draws conclusions regarding research objectives, answers the 
investigative questions and proposes future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the state of health management for 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS), provide an ISHM system taxonomy, and summarize the 
major areas of research currently being performed. The first section discusses current 
health management practices and describes key terminology. The second section provides 
a description of a typical ISHM system as described by literature and the third section 
lists expected benefits and applicable metrics of ISHM. The fourth section describes the 
main modeling approaches for analyzing the performance or cost-benefit tradeoffs of 
ISHM systems. The fifth section gives an overview of current analytic architectures. The 
last section summarizes the information provided. 
2.2 Background 
In order to quantify the effects of ISHM on a system, the current health management 
practices must be investigated for comparison; this section discusses current health 
management practices and describes key terminology. 
 
2.2.1 Current State of UAS Health Management 
The Air Force UAS programs currently use independent sensors incorporated into the 
vehicle’s hardware to monitor for fault indicators on critical subsystems. The sensor data 
is continuously transmitted to ground operations where it is processed. If the data 
 
9 
 
indicates a fault has occurred the ground operator executes pre-determined mitigation 
steps, dependent on which sensor indicated a fault, and sends a message to maintenance. 
Once the vehicle lands, maintenance personnel perform diagnostic tests to confirm the 
location and identify the type of fault, and then perform maintenance actions to restore 
the component. This is less a health management system than a health monitoring system, 
in terms of nomenclature. The algorithms used for these systems generally only indicate 
an off-nominal condition; they do not give any other information typical of a health 
management system. 
 
2.2.2 Taxonomy 
Understanding the ISHM system and the benefits it offers depends greatly on 
understanding several key terms: failures, errors, faults, novel events, fault detection, 
fault isolation, diagnostics, and prognostics. 
 
Failure is defined as a “deviation in behavior between the system and its requirements. 
Since the system does not maintain a copy of its requirements, a failure is not observable 
by the system” [Buede, 2000]. 
 
Error is defined as “a subset of the system state, which may lead to failure. The system 
can monitor its own state, so errors are observable in principle. Failures are inferred when 
errors are observed. Since a system is usually not able to monitor its entire state 
continuously, not all errors are observable. As a result, not all failures are going to be 
detected (inferred)” [Buede, 2000]. 
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A fault is a known “defect in the system that can cause an error. Faults can be permanent 
(e.g., a failure of system component that requires replacement) or temporary due to either 
an internal malfunction or external transient. Temporary faults may not cause a 
sufficiently noticeable error or may cause a permanent fault in addition to a temporary 
error” [Buede, 2000]. 
 
A novel event is another type of anomaly in the same class as a fault. The difference is 
that a fault is a known defect, where novel events are unknown. Prognostic algorithms are 
designed to respond to known events (faults), not novel events [Atlas, 2001]. 
 
Degradation involves a declining performance measure that changes with time, 
particularly to a lower condition, quality, or level. Generally, systems will continue to 
operate in a degraded mode, but not at a specified operating level. Whether the 
degradation has advanced to a fault or failure state will be determined as part of the 
reliability specification [Ebeling, 2010]. 
 
Fault detection is the “determination that the performance of a system or subsystem does 
not correspond to its expected behavior.  In more general terms, it is determining that a 
failure has occurred” [Ross, 1999]. 
 
Fault isolation is the “determination of the specific cause of failure so corrective action 
can be taken… Ideally, systems are partitioned such that measurable functions can be 
implemented on the lowest repairable assembly” [Ross, 1999]. 
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Diagnostics can be described as “the process of locating [a] fault at the level in which 
restoration may be accomplished” [Ebeling, 2010]. The process includes the utilization of 
monitoring hardware and/or software to detect and isolate faults in a given system [Clutz, 
2003]. In some expanded definitions, diagnostics can even include determination of a 
failure cause [Cardona, 1999]. For the purpose of this thesis, diagnostics will be defined 
as “the utilization of monitoring hardware and/or software to determine the failure cause 
by detecting and isolating faults.” 
 
Prognostics is defined as an assessment of likely future health (educated prediction) of a 
piece of equipment, based on current information [Cardona, 1999]. Prognostics builds on 
current diagnostic capabilities using automated procedures to calculate the Estimated 
Time to Failure of a system or component. A prognostics system is often associated with 
condition-based maintenance, since the results of a prognostic analysis indicates required 
maintenance actions, either real-time or predicted [Clutz, 2003].   
 
All these definitions are brought together in Figure 2, which shows a typical component 
health trajectory. Diagnostics tells “what” fault curve the component is on and 
prognostics determines “where” on the overall health curve the component currently 
resides. 
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Figure 2 - Component Life: 100% Healthy to 100% Failed [Atlas, 2001] 
 
2.3 Notional ISHM Configuration 
An ISHM system is envisioned to serve two primary goals: to monitor the “functional 
health” of the system real-time; and to facilitate the maintenance and availability of the 
system by diagnosing the physical break-downs in the system that can be replaced off-
line. These two goals are further explained below: 
1.  Real-time monitoring of the functional health of the system: ISHM must 
constantly monitor the functional health of the system to detect and isolate 
faults. From this standpoint, the system is regarded as a ‘collection of 
functional units’ (rather than physical units) that must perform flawlessly to 
constitute the overall function(s) of the mission. Depending on the level of 
autonomy, criticality, and authority, ISHM could either make ‘real-time’ 
decisions to reroute flows of information, energy, or material from the failed 
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unit to ensure continuous operability, or send appropriate information to a 
human-in-the-loop for decision making. The information ISHM provides to the 
decision maker should have integrity and be relayed within enough time to 
facilitate a good outcome. 
2.  Determining the physical health of the system: To help maintain the physical 
health of the system, ISHM must be able to determine which physical 
component has failed or is going to fail and the effect of the failed component 
on the system’s capabilities. By continuously monitoring physical units, the 
information collected from ISHM should also be used to identify long-term 
degradation effects that could cause failures [Mehr, 2005]. 
Using these goals, this section describes a notional ISHM configuration.  
 
A typical ISHM system consists of sensors placed at critical components within 
subsystems of the vehicle that stream data to a management system. The management 
system processes the sensor data, executes diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, and then 
feeds this information through a reasoner, as seen in Figure 3. This management system 
can either be on-board the vehicle in a hardware configuration or off-board enabling the 
ground command and control (C2) element. 
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Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or specifically 
tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic sensors, or 
proximity devices. The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises 
and manipulated to extract fault features. The diagnostic module then analyzes the fault 
features to detect, identify, and isolate developing failure conditions. The diagnostic 
information will be combined with historical data in the prognostic module to generate an 
estimation of failure times. Algorithms developed for the diagnostic and prognostic 
modules are generally based on mathematical models (e.g., Hamilton dynamic, 
Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or pattern recognition (e.g., fuzzy-logic, 
statistical/regression methods, neural network clustering). Finally, the diagnostic and 
prognostic information is turned over to the reasoner module which analyzes available 
resources, decides which hazard mitigation steps to execute, and then passes the selected 
decision to the on-board C2 module and relays appropriate information to the ground C2 
operator and maintenance element [Benedettini, 2009]. 
Management System 
On-Board C2 
Figure 3 - Typical ISHM configuration [Benedettini, 2009] 
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2.4 Expected Benefits and Applicable Metrics 
The overall desired effect of an ISHM system would be to continuously monitor the 
system, detect and isolate either a real-time fault or pre-cursers to a fault, determine the 
criticality of the fault, and then relay appropriate information to ground control, the on-
board C2 module, and maintenance for action. Benefits of this capability are discussed in 
the remaining sub-sections. 
 
2.4.1 Effect on Scheduled and Unscheduled Maintenance 
The Air Force goal for prognostic systems such as ISHM is to completely eliminate 
traditional aircraft inspection and repair patterns [Ross, 1999]. Currently, a 
malfunctioning unit is either identified in-flight (based off an alert from an individual 
sensor) or identified through scheduled inspections. There is an inherent probability of a 
false alarm and a probability of fault detection, meaning that the aircraft could be 
incorrectly pulled from an on-going mission or could continue on a mission with an 
unknown fault that could lead to system failure. The integrated aspect of ISHM proposes 
to severely reduce the false alarm rate and increase the total probability of detection, as 
understanding the full health status of the vehicle can identify false positives and identify 
if a fault or failure has occurred down-stream. For example: a sensor falsely identifies a 
valve stuck closed, a sensor further down the stream indicates a normal flow rate and the 
system has not lost any performance aspects; ISHM would therefore not report this as a 
system fault, but as a sensor fault.  
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With the continuous monitoring provided by ISHM, pre-cursors to faults can also be 
identified and Estimated Time to Failures of the component or total system will be 
reported. Additionally, if multiple mission data is stored, every time a fault occurs, the 
data collected by ISHM can be used to identify new indicators or pre-cursors to a failure 
to be uploaded into the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms.  
 
The overall result is that with ISHM implemented, the probability of unscheduled 
maintenance, currently inflated due to prevalent “Could Not Duplicate” and “No Defect 
Found” maintenance results, should decrease as unscheduled maintenance should become 
more fault driven. Scheduled maintenance intervals can also be investigated for potential 
relaxation or removal; current intervals may be conservatively small to counteract the 
current lack of health awareness. Ideally with ISHM, the aircraft would replace time-
based or event-driven maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where 
maintenance is only performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable 
failure of a system or its components [OSAIDD, 1999]. 
 
Metrics (unless stated otherwise, all formulas in this Chapter are from An Introduction to 
Reliability and Maintainability Engineering by Charles Ebeling, 2010):  
 
Tpm – Mean Time between Performances of Preventative (Scheduled) Maintenance  
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MTBM – Mean Time between Maintenance (includes both scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance). The equation for MTBM is shown in Equation 1.  
 
     
  
      
  
   
 
 
where     = system design or (economic) life 
       = expected number of failures in the interval (0,   ) 
 
RU - Rate of Unscheduled Maintenance. The equation for RU is shown in Equation 2. 
 
    
      
   
 
where        = expected number of failures in the interval (0,    ) 
 
MDT – Mean Downtime. The equation for MDT is shown in Equation 3. 
 
     
           
  
   
     
      
  
   
 
 
where     = Mean Time to Repair 
      = mean preventative maintenance time 
  
PD - Probability of Detection 
                                                 
 
PFA - Probability of False Alarm 
                                                     
 
2.4.2 Decreased Mean Time to Repair 
Current fault detection is limited to identifying the occurrence of a fault and an 
approximate location, meaning that fault isolation can only occur after the aircraft has 
landed. There is also a non-unity probability that the mechanic can even correctly identify 
the failure mode once it lands. With ISHM, both fault detection and isolation are 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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performed in-flight, within a specified confidence level, and the appropriate information 
is relayed to the maintenance element. This gives the maintenance element time to pre-
position the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order any necessary 
replacement parts, severely reducing the total Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) after an 
event.  
 
As a result of its continuous monitoring, ISHM would also reduce maintenance time 
during scheduled inspections. Prognostics would, theoretically, calculate an Estimated 
Time to Failure (ETF) for each component, resulting in each inspection only focusing on 
those systems that had passed an ETF threshold in that time interval. Knowing that the 
specific systems to be inspected ahead of time would again allow the maintenance 
element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order 
any necessary replacement parts. ISHM would also negate the current use of time-
intensive Built-in Test (BIT) units, as each system would be continuously tested. 
 
2.4.3 Operational Availability Improvement 
Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled 
maintenance from ISHM, the Operational Availability for each aircraft should improve. 
Another factor affecting Operational Availability is mission turn-around time, or the time 
from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM, 
mission turn-around time can include lengthy BIT tests to check for failures. Since these 
tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault 
detection, the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing Operational 
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Availability. Whether measured in maintenance downtime or a reduction in hours 
required for testing and diagnostics, etc., the net result is that a system with ISHM will be 
available for use more of the time.  
 
Metrics:  
AO - Operational Availability. The equation for AO is shown in Equation 6. 
   
    
        
 
 
2.4.4 Increased Mission Success 
Having situational awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground 
operations in providing full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and 
due to the fault criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer 
trajectory, ground operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the 
priority targets. Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the 
remaining performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to 
conservatively scrap that particular mission set.  
 
An additional aspect of increased situational awareness is its affect on UAS flight limits. 
Modern autonomous flight control systems limit the vehicle to safe operating loads and 
environments; this operating envelope is pre-defined and conservative. With ISHM, the 
flight envelope can theoretically be expanded and defined by the design criteria for the 
vehicle. Health data would then be used to restrict the envelope to a prescribed level in 
(6) 
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the event of a detected fault. This would increase the operational capability of the vehicle, 
allowing for larger mission sets. Improved situational awareness combined with the 
theoretical improved Operational Availability would greatly improve the rate of mission 
success. 
 
Metrics: 
RMS - Rate of Successful Completed Missions. The equation for RMS is shown in 
Equation 7. 
    
                    
                       
 
 
2.4.5 Cost Savings 
The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a 
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a 
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even 
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also 
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. However, there is an inherent 
cost in implementing ISHM, not just to the vehicle but to the resulting operational 
infrastructure. The cost savings must be weighed against the implementation costs to 
truly investigate the financial aspect of ISHM. 
 
Cost avoidance measures could also be applied as a benefit of ISHM. ISHM identifies 
components or subsystems that are near failure, replacing or repairing these parts before 
(7) 
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they fail and cause damage to other parts would avoid the cost of repairing the additional 
damage. The upfront cost may be higher in the short run, but the final life cycle cost 
would be lower. 
2.5 Analytic Models 
The majority of analytic models for ISHM have been created by NASA at Ames 
Research Center. On-going research is aimed at developing a robust methodology that 
can evaluate different ISHM architectures to optimize a set of pre-determined metrics. 
This process, known as ISHM Systems Analysis and Optimization (SA&O), consists of a 
set of models that can be easily customized for a specific system. Using this SA&O 
process offers two immediate advantages: 
 The effects of ISHM on the overall safety, maintainability, and performance of 
the system can be calculated. 
  During design, engineers can use the process to find the ‘optimal ISHM 
architecture’ for that specific system [Mehr, 2005]. 
 
The original quantification process identified 24 metrics, listed in Table 3, to be used 
across four domains: Design for Testability (DFT) Model, Loss of Mission (LOM) 
Model, Turnaround Model, and Maintenance Model. 
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Table 3 - ISHM SA&O Process Metrics [Datta, 2004] 
1. Loss of Mission 
13. [UAS]/Subsystem Mean Time 
Between Failure 
2. Loss of Vehicle 14. Subsystem Availability 
3. Loss of Crew 15. [UAS] Turnaround Time 
4. Launch Availability 16. Cost of Spares 
5. Development Cost 17. [ISHM] Weight 
6. Production Cost 18. Subsystem Weight 
7. Annual Operational Cost 19. Fault Detection Coverage 
8. $/lb (Mission Price/lb) 20. Fault Isolation Coverage 
9. Inherent [ISHM]  Reliability 21. [ISHM]  False Alarm Rate 
10. Subsystem Reliability 22. Subsystem False Alarm Rate 
11. Subsystem Failure 
Probability 
23. Net Present Value and IRR of 
[UAS] program 
12. [UAS]/Subsystem Mean 
Time To Repair  
24. Probability of unscheduled 
maintenance 
 
The DFT Model assesses the ability of a given instrumentation suite to detect and isolate 
the faults for a proposed design, the size of ambiguity groups, and test point selection; 
fault detection and fault isolation metrics are derived for the ISHM system from the DFT 
Model. The LOM Model assesses the probability of failures that result in an inability to 
complete a given mission; the primary output for the LOM Model is the probability of 
loss of mission (as a metric). The Turnaround Model predicts the cost, time and resources 
required to prepare the UAS for the next mission; it models scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance and the repair process. Typically this model uses discrete simulation to 
output the new (ideally, lower) UAS turnaround times and costs of operations. The 
Maintenance Model is used to provide maintenance-related input on a subsystem-by-
subsystem basis as required by the turnaround and mission models. Figure 4 maps each 
of the metrics to each other and to the relevant model [Datta, 2004]. 
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Figure 4 - The ISHM SA&O Quantification Process Map [Datta, 2004] 
 
The SA&O process was found to have several shortcomings that hindered its application 
and generalization to larger and more complex systems: it was only capable of producing 
a ‘point-design’ instead of a suite of design alternatives, and it did not take into account 
that there are global (shared) as well as local design parameters for each subsystem. 
Building from the SA&O process and focusing on closing these gaps, the next approach 
to ISHM analysis is known as ISHM Multidisciplinary Multi-objective Systems Analysis 
and Optimization (MMSA&O). MMSA&O structures the design problem into a two-
level hierarchical architecture; an example can be seen in Figure 5.  
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In this process, ISHM is decomposed into a hierarchy of several sub-problems, each of 
which may contain multiple objectives. In its multi-disciplinary form (as seen in Figure 
6), the optimization problem can be organized into two levels: one sub-problem at the 
system level, and J sub-problems at the sub-system level.  
Figure 5 - Example Two-Tier Formulation of an ISHM Design Problem for a Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (RLV) [Mehr, 2005] 
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The goal of this optimization approach is to obtain a set of solutions (             that 
minimizes a weighted sum of R objectives while satisfying the constraints in all J sub-
problems. The equivalent single-level form of the multi-disciplinary problem is seen in 
Equation 8. 
  
where: 
     = functionally-separable objectives 
   = exclusive objectives 
    = shared variable vector  
   = variable vector exclusive to the sub-system 
   = system constraint vector 
   = constraint vector exclusive to the sub-system 
 
Figure 6 - Multi-Disciplinary Form of a Multi-Objective Optimization Problem [Mehr, 2005] 
(8) 
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The solutions from each sub-problem are then rolled up to the top-level for integration; 
however, since each sub-problem is solved independently, convergence matrices must be 
used to guide the full system optimization [Mehr, 2005]. 
 
The SA&O process was proven to significantly improve the efficiency of ISHM 
architecture, in one case study the percentage of total faults detected from the optimized 
ISHM increased to 75% from 12% in the original design [Mehr, 2005]. Likewise, the 
improved MMSA&O has seen percentages of total faults detected between 76 and 98% 
[Hoyle, 2007]. 
 
Both of these models only focus on the safety, maintainability, and performance of the 
new ISHM-enabled system. These models are missing a key environment that is 
necessary when truly evaluating the full effect of ISHM: the mission environment. What 
is the effect of higher availability and increased situational awareness on mission success 
rates over the lifetime of the vehicle? The effect on mission effectiveness must be 
quantified to help fully understand the cost/benefit tradeoff of ISHM. 
2.6 Analytic Architecture 
Historically, architecture and modeling had been performed relatively separately:  
“On one side of the fence, systems engineers … [develop] the in-
depth integrated architectures to define system concepts for development 
and production. On the other side, often times those evaluating the 
concepts for decision makers develop simulations and models from 
information obtained by performing their own research and interpretation 
of the system concept. The result of this disconnect is often times an 
inaccurate evaluation of the system that is actually developed and 
produced” [Dietrichs, 2006]. 
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In 2006, a group of AFIT graduate students bridged this gap by combining the 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) [DoD, 2012] and modeling 
techniques into an analytic architecture, resulting in the development of the Architecture 
Based Evaluation Process (ABEP) [Dietrichs, 2006].  
 
The ABEP is made up of the following eight steps (see Appendix A: Architecture-Based 
Evaluation Process (ABEP) for the process assumptions and further breakdown): 
1. Design Operations Concept of System to be evaluated. 
The Ops Concept provides the system operations which the architecture will 
model. 
2. Identify Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) relevant to the 
decision/evaluation. 
Identify the mission level metrics that represent the effectiveness of the 
system. 
 
3. Identify required level of abstraction for architecture to show traceability 
to MOEs. 
Analyze the Ops Concept to determine if MOEs are measured at the output of 
a system, within a system, or at the output of activities external to the system. 
 
4. Identify architecture views necessary to capture structure/relationships. 
a. Structure (OV-1, OV-2, and OV-5 mandatory) 
b. Decision Logic (OV-6a mandatory) 
c. As Required: SV-2, SV-4, SV-7, OV-6b, OV-6c 
 
5. Develop architecture views. 
Develop or acquire the architecture views identified in Step 4 IAW DoDAF to 
include all relevant activities and entities. 
 
6. Develop Modeling and Simulation to replicate architecture. 
a. Select modeling or analytical tools best suited to meet evaluation 
requirements 
b. Model structure of simulation or analytical solution to match 
architecture 
c. Model decision logic of simulation or analytical solution to match OV-
6a 
d. Choose input parameters consistent with SV products 
 
28 
 
e. Calculate MOEs at output of activities as functions of design 
parameters 
 
7. Evaluate Model Completeness. 
Determine whether model considers all relevant aspects of the 
system/concept. 
 
8. Evaluate model for MOE results, requirements, and key parameters. 
a. Once the model is complete, evaluate the system’s ability to meet 
target metrics 
b. Vary design parameters and perform sensitivity analysis to identify 
key parameters 
c. Compare sensitivity analysis to target MOEs to help establish/refine 
requirements and KPPs 
d. If not already accomplished, develop SV-7 Systems Performance 
Parameters Matrix and identify critical performance parameters 
e. Vary system design and design parameters to evaluate the system’s 
robustness and its rate of degradation 
 
2.7 Design of Experiments 
Design of Experiments (DOE) is a type of statistical design in which  
“purposeful changes are made to the input variables of a process or system so that 
we may observe and identify the reasons for changes that may be observed in the 
output response… [These experiments are planned] so that appropriate data will 
be collected and analyzed by statistical methods, resulting in valid and objective 
conclusions” [Montgomery, 2009].  
 
For this research effort, DOE techniques will be used to supplement the ABEP when 
evaluating models. The DOE techniques used will follow the seven guidelines provided 
in Design and Analysis of Experiments by Dr. Douglas Montgomery [2009]: 
 
1. Recognition of and Statement of the Problem 
A clear statement of the problem provides a better understanding of the phenomenon 
being studied and the final solution of the problem. It is important to keep the overall 
objective in mind to avoid wasting time, materials, and other resources. 
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2. Selection of the Response Variable 
The response variable or variables “provides useful information about the process under 
study.” This is often the output of a process, or a measurable characteristic of a system. 
There may be one or more response variables. 
 
3. Choice of Factors, Levels, and Range 
Design factors are “those [variables] that the experimenter may wish to vary in the 
experiment.” These factors are expected to have a large effect on the response variable. 
Once the experimenter has selected the factors, they “must choose the ranges over which 
these factors will be varied and the specific levels at which runs will be made.” A very 
common method of choosing levels is to select a high and a low point that covers a range 
that the experimenter deems is appropriate for operating conditions or is of interest to the 
experiment.  
 
4. Choice of Experimental Design 
Choosing the design involves consideration of sample size, selection of an appropriate 
run order, and determination of any restrictions in the design. The three basic principles 
of experimental design are randomization, where both the allocation of resources and the 
order in which the individual trials are performed are randomly determined; replication, 
or independent repeats of each factor combination; and blocking, a design technique used 
to improve the precision with this comparisons among the factors of interest are made. 
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A common experimental design that combines these three principles is a factorial 
experiment, in which factors are varied together instead of one at a time. This particular 
experiment enables the experimenter to easily investigate the individual effects of each 
factor and to determine where the factors interact. If there were k factors, each at two 
levels (high and low), the factorial design requires 2
k
 runs. Generally if there are more 
than five factors, it becomes cumbersome to run all possible combinations of factor 
levels.  
 
Another experimental design, a fractional factorial experiment, is a variation of the 
factorial experiment in which only a subset of the runs are used. These designs rely on 
the experimenter assuming that certain high-order interactions are negligible, and that the 
important information is found in the main factors and low-order interactions. This is also 
known as the sparsity of effects principle. A major use of this experiment is for screening 
factors to identify those factors (if any) that have large effects on the response. 
 
5. Performing the Experiment 
It is vital to monitor the process carefully to ensure that the procedure is executed 
according to plan. Errors in procedure will usually destroy experimental validity. 
 
6. Statistical Analysis of the Data 
If the experiment has been designed correctly and performed according to the design, the 
statistical methods required can be simple. The output of the experiment should be a 
model that describes the response surface of the process or system being investigated. 
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The most commonly used statistical inference procedure to validate this model is the 
Analysis of Variance, which relies on portioning the total variability into its component 
parts: variance due to the model, and variance due to random error. Certain assumptions 
have to be satisfied for this procedure to be implemented, specifically that the errors are 
normally and independently distributed with mean zero and constant but unknown 
variance σ
2
. Violations of these assumptions can be investigated by examination of the 
residuals, or the difference between the observed value and the predicted value.  If the 
model is valid the residuals should be structureless, or containing no obvious patterns.  
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Once the data has been statistically analyzed, the experimenter can draw practical 
conclusions about the results and recommend a course of action. Confirmation testing can 
be performed to validate the conclusions, if necessary. Often, full investigation of the 
response surface involves iterative experimentation, as each new experiment builds on 
the conclusions found in the last. 
2.8 Literature Review Summary 
This section discussed and identified several key terms, such as faults, failures, 
prognostics and diagnostics, that are necessary for understanding an ISHM system and 
identified current health management practices for Unmanned Aerial Systems. A typical 
ISHM configuration was introduced and had the following components: a sensor suite 
placed along critical system elements, and a management component that included sensor 
data processing, diagnostic and prognostic algorithms to identify current or incipient 
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faults, and a reasoner to select the appropriate mitigation steps to execute. The expected 
performance, maintenance, and mission benefits of adding a typical ISHM configuration 
to a UAS were identified and discussed. 
 
Prior analytic models were also investigated. Most published research concerning 
analytic modeling of Integrated System Health Management were found to be generally 
concerned with quantifying the effects of ISHM on the performance and scheduled 
maintenance of the intended recipient system. Few, if any, addressed the effect of ISHM 
on mission success rates; most that did addressed this aspect at a mission level and did 
not address the system degradation that would occur over the lifetime of the vehicle. 
Finally, this chapter discussed the analytic architecture process model that will be used in 
Chapter III to help quantify the effect of ISHM on mission success rates. 
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the process of developing an analytic 
architecture to be used to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of installing an 
ISHM system on a UAS. The development will follow the eight-step Architecture Based 
Evaluation Process (ABEP) described in Section 2.6, and will be IAW the Department of 
Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF). 
3.2 Design ISHM Concept of Operations 
Per Step 1 of the ABEP, Concept of Operations (CONOPs) will be developed based upon 
discussions with the users. To help organize the competing objectives of ISHM and 
ISHM’s analysis, two CONOPs will be built: the first detailing the ISHM system to be 
implemented, the second focusing on the analytic architecture model. The CONOPs will 
adhere to Air Force Policy Directive 10-28 and will outline basic Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs), sequences of events, command relationships, and the expected 
output data from the model. 
 
The ISHM CONOPs is meant to be as general as possible and will take a system-level 
view of the technology. Capabilities and characteristics will be taken mostly from the 
research completed in the literature review with implementation directed at an Unmanned 
Aerial System. 
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The purpose of the Analytic Architecture CONOPs is to primarily answer the research 
questions posed in Chapter I. For the purpose of this research effort, the architecture 
created will provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any 
autonomous vehicle. The architecture will be built using the characteristics and 
capabilities detailed in the ISHM CONOPs and will be used to design an analytic model 
that quantifies the effect of ISHM on the operational availability and mission success 
rate.  
3.3 Identify Measures of Effectiveness 
The next two steps, Step 2 and 3, continue development with the creation and analysis of 
a list of MOEs to be used to evaluate ISHM.  MOEs should primarily be derived from the 
expected benefits of ISHM. Section 2.4, Table 3 and the ISHM CONOPs built in the 
previous section list several metrics that have already been identified as pertaining to the 
performance of ISHM. The MOEs chosen should reflect the purpose and desired output 
of the analytic model, as they will ultimately guide the development of the model; 
leaving out key evaluation metrics would cause an inappropriate output from the model.  
 
Once the MOEs are chosen, they should be analyzed against the CONOPs to determine 
where in the system (within, at the output, through an external system) they are 
measured. The MOEs will also be used to identify within the overall system’s 
architecture those products that specifically addressed ISHM. From these products, a 
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Rules Model can be built that will abstract activities and will serve as the basis for the 
ISHM simulation. 
 
For this research effort, the analytic architecture will have the capability to ingest system 
failure characteristics, in this case an appropriate failure distribution that models the total 
system as well as probabilities of occurrence for the fault categories listed in Table 4, and 
ISHM performance characteristics, such as the probability of detection, the probability of 
a false alarm, and the diagnostic algorithm confidence level (a probability that the 
diagnostic subsystem will correctly identify the fault). These categories are not exclusive 
to degradation effects; the Estimated Time to Failure could be calculated for a component 
experiencing long-term system degradation due to normal wear and tear or for a 
component operating at a high level of stress. The analytic architecture will then have the 
capability to use those input variables to calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM 
and without ISHM for comparison: number of unscheduled maintenance actions, and the 
rate of mission success. 
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Table 4 - Fault Categories 
Fault Category Category Definition 
I 
The calculated Expected Time to Failure is much 
greater than mission length. Maintenance can wait 
until the next scheduled Preventative Maintenance 
activity. 
II 
The calculated Expected Time to Failure is greater 
than mission length. Unscheduled Maintenance 
must occur after the current mission is completed. 
III 
The calculated Expected Time to Failure is less 
than mission length, but mission can still be 
completed with reduced capability. Unscheduled 
Maintenance must occur after the current mission is 
completed. 
IV 
The calculated Expected Time to Failure is less 
than mission length and the UAS must abort the 
mission and return to base immediately. 
Unscheduled Maintenance must occur as soon as 
possible. 
V 
Catastrophic Damage expected from fault. Loss of 
vehicle occurs 
 
3.4 Identify and Develop Architecture Views 
Step 4 and 5 identifies and then develops the architecture views necessary to capture all 
the inter-relationships. The ABEP offers several mandatory and recommended products 
that should be developed to cover the overall structure and decision logic. Using the 
previously developed CONOPs as the basis, nearly all evaluations will require an OV-1 
(High Level Operations Concept) and OV-2 (Operational Node Connectivity 
Description), and all will require an OV-5b (Operational Activity Model). The level of 
abstraction for the OV-5 will have been identified in the previous section. For the 
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decision logic, an OV-6a (Rules Model) will be developed to match the level of 
abstraction used for the OV-5.  
 
Additional necessary views will be identified through the CONOPs and the selected 
MOEs. Some additional views called out by the ABEP that have been used in the past 
include the SV-2 (Systems Resource Flow Description), SV-4 (Systems Functionality 
Description), SV-7 (Systems Measures Matrix), OV-6b (State Transition Diagram), and 
OV-6c (Event-Trace Description). All identified views will then be developed IAW 
DoDAF guidelines.  
 
Current views planned for this research effort are displayed in Table 5 along with their 
purpose. 
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Table 5 - Planned Architecture Views 
Operational Views Purpose 
OV-1    High Level Operations 
Concept 
Provides a graphical depiction of what the 
architecture is about and an idea of the 
players and operations involved 
OV-2    Operational Node 
Connectivity Description 
Depicts Operational Needlines (flows of funding, 
personnel and materiel in addition to 
information) that indicate a need to exchange 
resources 
OV-5a  Operational Activity         
Decomposition Tree 
Decomposes the operational activities that are 
normally conducted in the course of achieving a 
mission  
OV-5b  Operational Activity       
Model 
Describes input/output flows, dependencies and 
relationships, and external interchanges between 
operational activities 
OV-6a   Rules Model 
Describes the rules under which the architecture 
behave under specified conditions 
System Views Purpose 
SV-1     Systems Interface Model 
Depicts all System Resource Flows between 
Systems that are of interest 
All Views Purpose 
AV-1    Overview and Summary 
Information 
Provides executive-level summary information in 
a consistent form that allows quick reference and 
comparison between views. 
 
3.5 Develop Analytic Modeling and Simulation 
Selecting the modeling or analytical tools best suited to meet the purpose of the analysis 
is Step 6 of the ABEP. The model should be consistent with the architecture: the structure 
should match the OV-2 and OV-5b products, the decision logic should be based off of the 
OV-6a, and the parameters should be consistent with the systems described in the SV-1. 
The additional views will not be directly involved with the analytic model but are 
required to ensure the architecture products are consistent with each other: the OV-1 and 
CV-1 provide general overviews for each viewpoint, the SV-5b ensures that the 
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operational activities in the OV’s are matched to the ISHM systems described in the SV-
1, and the AV-1 ties all the views together.  
 
For this evaluation of the effect of ISHM on mission effectiveness, a spreadsheet model 
will be built in Microsoft Excel. The model will run over the lifetime of a UAS, whose 
failure characteristics serve as an input to the model, and will output unscheduled 
maintenance actions and mission success rates using ISHM performance characteristics. 
Each lifetime will be considered a Monte Carlo event, with each scheduled maintenance 
interval or unscheduled maintenance repair acting as a renewal process for the UAS (a 
process that restores the vehicle to “its original or ‘as good as new’ condition”) [Ebeling, 
2010].  
 
The full list of parameters needed for the model and their definitions are displayed in 
Table 6; the inputs are divided between characteristics of the UAS and performance 
measures of the proposed ISHM addition, the outputs are divided between expected 
maintenance actions and a calculated rate of mission success as defined by Equation 7. 
The user can also select how many Monte Carlo simulations to execute, up to 500 
iterations of the lifetime of the UAS. 
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Table 6 - ISHM Analytic Model Parameters 
UAS Properties 
(Input) 
Definitions 
P(Failure) Probability of a failure occurring; a failure distribution 
P(Fault Categories) 
If a fault occurs, the probability of it falling into each of the five 
fault categories; a number between 0 and 1 for each fault category 
Average Mission 
Length 
The average mission length for the UAS; in hours 
Scheduled 
Maintenance Interval 
The interval between scheduled maintenance; in hours 
Expected System 
Lifetime 
The expected lifetime of the UAS; in hours 
ISHM Properties 
(Input) 
Definitions 
P
D
 Probability of detecting a fault; between 0 and 1 
                                              
P
FA
 Probability of the sensor reading a false alarm; between 0 and 1 
                                                 
D
CL
 ISHM’s Diagnostic Confidence Level, or the strength of the 
prognostic and diagnostic algorithms; between 0 and 1 
Expected Model 
Output 
Definitions 
Baseline 
Maintenance Actions 
Expected number of maintenance actions for a UAS using current 
health management practices 
Baseline Rate of 
Mission Success 
Expected rate of mission success for a UAS using current health 
management practices 
ISHM Maintenance 
Actions 
Expected number of maintenance actions for the baseline UAS 
with the addition of ISHM 
ISHM Rate of 
Mission Success 
Expected rate of mission success for the baseline UAS with the 
addition of ISHM 
Model Properties Definitions 
Number of 
Simulations 
Number of lifetime simulations to execute; from 1 to 500 
 
3.6 Evaluate Model 
The model will then be evaluated for completeness and ability to meet the target metrics 
in the final Steps 7 and 8. In Step 7, the model is evaluated solely on its ability to 
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consider all relevant aspects (processes, assumptions, input variables, output data and 
MOEs) of the concept. If the model is determined to not be complete, the process will 
return to Step 3 with some additional considerations (listed in Appendix A: Architecture-
Based Evaluation Process (ABEP)). If the model is considered complete, the process will 
proceed to Step 8. 
 
The final step deals with the results of the model. Representative data for a UAS will be 
fed into the model and Design of Experiments (DOE) techniques will be used to 
determine situations where ISHM can be effectively used. The response for this analysis 
is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated for a system 
without ISHM (i.e. using current health management techniques) and a system with 
ISHM. The intent is to explore the response surface where this difference is maximized, 
which coincides with the operational area where ISHM would be most beneficial. 
Representative data can be found in Table 7. 
Table 7 - Representative UAS Data 
UAS Properties Values 
P(Failure) - Distribution Weibull Distribution  
Average Mission Length 10 hours 
Scheduled Maintenance Interval 1,000 hours 
Expected System Lifetime 10,000 hours 
 
Without actual UAS failure data, a Weibull failure distribution for P(Failure) was chosen 
because of its ability to model the minimum of a large number of independent positive 
random variables from several classes of distributions (i.e., the distribution is great at 
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modeling a system of systems where a failure in one component causes a system-level 
failure) [Meeker, 1998]. The scale and shape parameters will be left up to DOE analysis 
to determine the region where the response is maximized. 
 
The average mission length, scheduled maintenance interval, and expected lifetime were 
chosen by the researcher to represent a typical UAS. They do not reflect any specific 
aircraft in the USAF inventory. 
3.7 Summary 
This section went into detail as to how the ABEP is used to create an analytic model for 
the purpose of evaluating ISHM. The architecture that will be built for the purposes of 
this research effort will represent a general ISHM, as researched in Chapter II. The 
analytic model based off this architecture will be focused primarily on analyzing mission 
effectiveness using generated unscheduled maintenance actions and mission success 
rates. The architecture, model, and model results are described in detail in Chapter IV.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will present the completed architecture, resulting analytic model, and an 
analysis of representative UAS failure data. 
4.2 ISHM Architecture 
This section details the architecture developed using the methodology in Chapter III. 
Since the focus of this research effort is on the analytic nature of the architecture, only 
views directly relevant to the analytic model will be discussed in detail in this section. 
The full system architecture can be found in Appendix B: ISHM Architecture. 
 
4.2.1 Integrated Systems Health Management Concept of Operations 
The architecture relies heavily on a robust concept of operations, especially when 
designing the systems and operations viewpoints. The full concept of operations for a 
typical ISHM system can be found in Appendix B.1 Integrated System Health 
Management Concept of Operations, but for the purposes of understanding the resulting 
viewpoints in this chapter, critical portions of the necessary capabilities, enabling 
capabilities, sequenced actions, and command relationships are described below. 
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Necessary Capabilities – Data Management 
The ISHM system must provide continuous monitoring over the entirety of the vehicle. 
Sensors are placed in critical locations in order to feed information on the state of the 
system. Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or 
specifically tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic 
sensors, or proximity devices. 
 
Data Management also includes parameter sets, vehicle configuration, and a data store 
with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation steps. Current 
mission sensor data and event recording can either be kept in an on-board data storage 
system sent to ground as required, or continuously streamed to ground control. 
 
Necessary Capabilities – Fault Detection 
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to 
extract fault features (either current or pre-cursers) and provide a comprehensive system 
picture. Fault Detection combines diagnostic information with historical data (prognostic 
reasoning) to generate an estimation of failure times. These fault indications are then 
sorted, prioritized, and distributed to insure action within time to criticality. Algorithms 
developed for diagnostic and prognostic calculations are generally based on mathematical 
models (e.g. Hamilton dynamic, Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or 
pattern recognition (e.g. fuzzy-logic, statistical/regression methods, neural network 
clustering). 
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Necessary Capabilities – Fault Isolation 
After identifying that a fault has occurred, ISHM must pinpoint the fault mechanism (i.e. 
the specific cause of failure) and its location. If not identifiable through prognostic or 
diagnostic reasoning, common fault mechanisms for that location can be identified using 
historical failure data. 
 
Necessary Capabilities – Health State Assessment 
ISHM must have the capability to assess and assign levels of health to the vehicle. This is 
achieved by calculating the remaining vehicle capabilities based on a capability model 
and the current fault state of the system. A notional capability model is hierarchically 
based, where the higher-level capability is computed using the values of the lower-level 
capabilities and a mathematical expression. Faults are quantified at the lowest level with 
system-level capability computations that orient this data with mission requirements to 
determine effects on the vehicle. 
 
Necessary Capabilities – Select Mitigation Procedures 
The ISHM system will provide mitigation procedures in the event of a known fault for 
the on-board flight control to act on if necessary. In order to perform this capability, 
ISHM will a) examine the available resources to determine any performance limitations 
and to estimate the time to criticality; b) confirm the diagnosed event and declare it to be 
a valid vehicle event with a high confidence level; c) access the fault data store for the 
appropriate safe state and the feasible step alternatives; before d) selecting the action 
steps that allow completion within the criticality time and performance limitations. These 
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action procedures will then be sent to the on-board flight control and to ground control. 
Since ISHM operates only on known faults and known mitigations, any unknown fault 
will immediately be assigned a critical level of health and the aircraft will automatically 
return to base.  
 
Enabling Capabilities 
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on 
the vehicle prior to ISHM being implemented [Ebeling, 2010]. This is an iterative process 
that identifies failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on 
the system, isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative 
measures. The results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components 
where sensors need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation, 
and assign criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes. 
 
Sequenced Actions - Nominal Operations 
The ISHM system will be continuously monitoring the health state of the UAS and will 
communicate either continuously or on set intervals (barring a fault event) the health 
status of the UAS. ISHM will also be continuously calculating an Estimated Time to 
Failures for every monitored component. 
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Sequenced Actions - Real-Time Fault Event 
Once a failure occurs, the following actions should take place: 
(1) ISHM locates the fault and identifies the failure mode 
(2) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health 
status to the appropriate level 
(3) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle  
(4) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures, 
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits. 
(5) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the 
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element 
 a.   The on-board flight control can: 
  (i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)   
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or 
reshape the current trajectory  
b.   The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the 
criticality of the event, can: 
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within 
its new capability 
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision  
c.   The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate 
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Sequenced Actions - Pre-Cursor to Fault is Detected 
When a pre-cursor to a fault is detected, the following actions should take place: 
(1) ISHM locates the affected component and identifies the impending failure 
mode 
(2) ISHM calculates an Estimated Time to System (or Component) Failure 
(3) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health 
status to the appropriate level 
(4) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle  
(5) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures, 
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits. 
(6) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the 
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element 
 a.   The on-board flight control can: 
  (i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)   
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or 
reshape the current trajectory  
b.   The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the 
criticality of the event, can: 
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within 
its new capability 
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision  
c.   The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate 
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Command Relationships - Ground Control 
Ground systems are normally treated as separate systems, and their relationship to the 
vehicle has typically been one of controller and operator; in this case, ground is 
hierarchically superior to the vehicle and commands it for some mission phases but is 
reactionary for others. Vehicle control transitions between ground and on-board 
depending on mission phase and particular event conditions:  
 Before Launch 
o Ground is master 
o Control transitions to vehicle during launch sequence 
 During Flight 
o Vehicle is master (autonomous) 
o Ground monitors via downlink telemetry 
o Ground takes control when appropriate  
 Post Landing 
o Ground is master (after auto-safing) 
 
Command Relationships - Maintenance and Logistics 
Maintenance and Logistics can be considered part of ground control (under the 
overarching domain of “Operations Control Center”) or a separate system entirely. Their 
relationship to the vehicle is either reactionary or scheduled and does not consist of a 
hierarchical relationship.  
 
Interactions: 
 Scheduled Maintenance: Based on flight hours and is performed at either the 
base-level or at a depot. Collected historical data from ISHM monitoring can be 
used to highlight components that need to be inspected. 
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 Unscheduled Maintenance: Initiated when a fault has been discovered. Once the 
ISHM has detected an anomaly, the appropriate data is sent to Maintenance and 
Logistic for action. 
 Post Mission: Degradation and non-critical fault information are sent to 
Maintenance and Logistics to improve vehicle turn-around time. 
 
Command Relationships - On-Board Flight Control 
The on-board flight control receives command to execute an action from ISHM generated 
by either ISHM and/or ground C2. The autonomous on-board flight control will 
decompose these decisions and action lists into a set of commands and send them to the 
appropriate systems for execution. On-board flight control schedules these tasks 
accordingly in order to complete in the prescribed time.  
 
As a vehicle system, on-board flight control health status, events, time, and mission 
information are continuously sent to ISHM. ISHM in turn continuously provides the 
vehicle system health assessments, vehicle capability, and mitigation actions 
predetermined for particular anomalies. 
 
4.2.2 OV-5b Operational Activity Models 
The OV-5b “Operational Activity Model” shows the activity flow needed for the 
operation of a typical ISHM system. For graphical simplicity, ISHM has been divided 
into three main activity models: the first (Figure 7) being the activities performed under 
nominal mission operations; the second (Figure 8) concerning the actions performed 
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when a fault is detected during a mission; and the third (Figure 9) the activities involved 
over the lifetime of the UAS. 
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Figure 7 - OV-5b "Nominal Mission Operations" 
 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Nominal Mission Operations]     
Mission Start
«OperationalActiv ity»
Receiv e Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
Process Sensor Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
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Package Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
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Mission
Complete
Fault Detected?
Time for
Heartbeat?
Mission Complete?
Fault
Detected
During
Mission
Or
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No
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Since current health management or monitoring technologies also use sensors, the 
activity flow through the diagram in Figure 7 is generally the same between a UAS with 
ISHM and one without. The difference occurs when a fault is detected, without ISHM 
there is no certainty as to what is actually occurring on the UAS and aside from a few 
prevalent and simplistic fault conditions the UAS will be recalled to base, ending the 
mission. With ISHM, greater system awareness is achieved and alternative mitigation 
actions can be found other than immediately recalling the vehicle. 
 
The OV-5b diagram “Fault During a Mission”, as seen in Figure 8, is where the bulk of 
ISHM activities are performed. Once a fault (or multiple faults) is confirmed, ISHM 
loops through the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, determining the type and location 
of the fault as well as calculating the estimated time to failure. This data is then pushed to 
the decision reasoning system, where the faults are prioritized and the remaining 
capability of the vehicle compared to the current mission tasking. Mitigation actions are 
then selected from the data store and recommended for the vehicle’s autonomous 
command and control system to evaluate. Ideally, the command and control system 
would accept the mitigation actions, execute them, and the UAS would be re-tasked or 
would continue on the mission as appropriate.  A situation where the command and 
control system would not accept the mitigation actions would be if ISHM recommended 
actions that would cause the UAS to depart flight; although this is unlikely, the hierarchy 
must be maintained as the autonomous command and control system is flight-critical and 
ISHM is not. 
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Figure 8 - OV-5b "Fault During Mission” 
 
 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Fault During Mission]     
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The activity flow through the OV-5b diagram “Lifetime Operations”, as seen in Figure 9, 
also parallels UAS without ISHM activities. The difference would be found in the 
quantity of activities performed, ideally a system with ISHM would have fewer 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions.  
 
Theoretically, a system with ISHM would approach condition-based maintenance, where 
all maintenance actions are driven by the prognostic and diagnostic modules, eliminating 
scheduled maintenance. However, current ISHM technologies have not yet reached a 
level of confidence where scheduled maintenance can be entirely removed from 
maintenance operations. To represent how ISHM would be introduced to Air Force 
operations in the current generation of technology, scheduled maintenance remains in the 
architecture as a health management action. 
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Figure 9 – OV-5b "Lifetime Operations" 
 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Lifetime Operations]     
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4.2.3 OV-6a Rules Model 
Development of the OV-6a Rules Model closely followed the development of the OV-5b 
diagrams. The OV-6a model, seen in Figure 10, represents the decisions made by ISHM 
over a single mission. The ISHM metrics that drive the model are the Probability of 
Detection (PD), the Probability of a False Alarm (PFA), and the Diagnostic Confidence 
Level (DCL). The Probability of Detection and Probability of a False Alarm are dependent 
on the sensor quality. Generally, a higher Probability of Detection also equates to a 
higher Probability of False Alarm. The Diagnostic Confidence Level represents the 
quality of the diagnostic and prognostics algorithms. Better algorithms would give a 
higher Diagnostic Confidence Level and therefore a better probability of assigning the 
correct fault category for a detected fault. The Rules Model logic is discussed further in 
Section 4.3.  
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Figure 10 - OV-6a "Rules Model" 
 
4.2.4 SV-1 Systems Interface Model  
The SV-1 Systems Interface Model depicted in Figure 11 is for a UAS with ISHM using 
current ISHM technology. In this architecture ISHM starts at the subsystem and 
component level, with each critical subsystem having its own prognostic/diagnostic 
module. Having the prognostic and diagnostic module at this lower level allows each 
module to be individually configured to best interpret the health of that particular 
subsystem. The prognostic and diagnostic module ingests data from the sensors (or 
sensor suites, depending on the complexity of the subsystem), and can command system 
effectors when investigating off-nominal conditions. An example of when effectors for a 
subsystem would be utilized is when detecting structural cracks; the module would excite 
a piezoelectric transducer (i.e. an effector), which would send out an elastic wave from 
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the transducer, the wave would then be measured by sensors further down the component 
and the module would evaluate the data for any deviations. 
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Figure 11 - SV-1 "Systems Interface Model" 
 «SV-1» composite structure SV-1 [SV-1]     
Vehicle SubSystem/Component Level
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«SystemInterface»
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The information from the subsystem and component level is then fed up to the system 
level to an Information Management System. This system includes the decision reasoner, 
a data store with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation 
steps, and another data collection module to store health-related data and to process 
information to be sent out as heartbeats (i.e. periodic health state assessments to ground-
based operations) or maintenance actions, as appropriate. In the case of a fault, the 
Information Management System assesses the new health of the vehicles (based on the 
estimated time to failure and current UAS capabilities) and selects the mitigation steps to 
be recommended the on-board command and control unit. This on-board command and 
control unit is represented by the Vehicle Management System in the diagram. 
 
The last level in the diagram includes the systems found at the ground level, to include 
the Operations Control Center; Ground Operations such as maintenance and logistics; 
and a ground component of ISHM. As with leaving scheduled maintenance as an activity 
in the OV-5b, the current state of ISHM technology does not allow for full autonomy in 
its decision making. Given time to review (some failures will be too imminent to allow 
time for review), a ground-based operator will be reviewing the activities controlled by 
ISHM, separate from the ground control center, and has the authority to override ISHM 
commands when appropriate.   
4.3 ISHM Analytic Model 
Using the Rules Model created in Figure 10, a model was developed to simulate the 
lifetime of a UAS and the effects of ISHM on the mission success rate and expected 
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number of unscheduled maintenance actions. The model parameters were displayed 
previously in Table 6. 
 
The model begins by generating a random fault time (in hours) from the failure 
distribution provided by the user, tFault, and four random numbers between 0 and 1: 
RANDDetect, RANDFA, RANDCategory, and RANDCM. The model then determines if a fault 
is detected, whether or not a fault has occurred, or if a fault was not detected, whether or 
not a fault has occurred, for an average mission length (tM), Probability of Detection (PD), 
and Probability of False Alarm (PFA) using Equation 9. 
                                        
                                       
                                       
                                    
                                     
 
A fault category is then assigned using RANDCategory and the P(Fault Categories) 
distribution provided by the user. Equation 10 displays how this category is assigned: 
                                                            
                                                                 
                                                                  
                                                                 
                            
(9) 
(10) 
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A confusion matrix, displayed in Table 8, is used to determine the declared fault category 
based upon CategoryTrue. The confusion matrix initiates using the diagnostic confidence 
level, DCL, as the basis, but the model al lows the user to input values manually if 
necessary. 
Table 8 - Confusion Matrix 
Confusion 
Matrix 
True Fault Category 
Declared 
Fault 
Category 
Nominal I II III IV V 
Nominal DCL (1-DCL)/2 0 0 0 0 
I 1-DCL DCL (1-DCL)/2 0 0 0 
II 0 (1-DCL)/2 DCL (1-DCL)/2 0 0 
III 0 0 (1-DCL)/2 DCL (1-DCL)/2 0 
IV 0 0 0 (1-DCL)/2 DCL 1-DCL 
V 0 0 0 0 (1-DCL)/2 DCL 
 
An example of using the confusion matrix given CategoryTrue = II can be seen in 
Equation 11: 
          
     
 
                              
                                                
                               
(11) 
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CategoryTrue and CategoryDetect are then used to calculate mission success rates and 
maintenance actions using the formulas found in Table 9. For this research effort, 
partially completed missions are considered successful missions. 
Table 9 - Mission Success and Maintenance Rates Formulas 
System without ISHM  Formula  
Mission Success?  
       1, if CategoryDetect = 0 AND CategoryTrue ≤ 2 
       0, otherwise  
Maintenance Required?  
       1, if CategoryDetect = 1, 2, 3, 4 
       0, otherwise  
System with ISHM  Formula  
Mission Success?  
1, otherwise 
0, if CategoryDetect ≥ 4  
     OR CategoryTrue ≥ 3 when CategoryDetect ≤ 2  
     OR CategoryTrue ≥ 4 when CategoryDetect = 3  
OR CategoryTrue = 5 
Maintenance Required?  
1, if CategoryDetect = 2, 3, 4 
0, otherwise  
 
The model then outputs the number of missions attempted, number of missions 
completed successfully, and number of unscheduled maintenance actions initiated for 
both a UAS with ISHM and without. 
 
This model has several assumptions and limitations that need to be weighed to fully 
understand how the results can be used by decision makers. 
 Each simulation is independent; a simulation being a lifetime of the UAS 
 Sensor and system degradation effects are not taken into account in this model 
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 The addition of ISHM causes negligible performance degradation of the UAS 
 The Probability of Detection (PD) and the Probability of False Alarm (PFA) are the 
same for a UAS without ISHM (using current health management practices) and 
with ISHM. In reality, ISHM would have additional sensors and effectors based 
on the results of the FMECA, resulting in a different PD and PFA. 
 Any fault detected will result in a cancelled mission under current 
detection/health management capabilities  
 The scheduled maintenance intervals act as a renewal process – that is, if the UAS 
reaches a scheduled maintenance interval, the vehicle is returned to a “like new” 
state.  
 PD and PFA are representative of the entire suite of sensors on the UAS. In reality, 
each sensor would have its own individual performance characteristics. 
 
The model was coded in Microsoft Excel© using Visual Basic Applications (VBA) for 
Excel; the full code can be found in Appendix C: Analytic Model Code. 
4.4 Model Analysis 
As stated in Chapter III, the model will be analyzed using Design of Experiments (DOE) 
techniques to determine the region where ISHM is most effective. As the model assumes 
that the sensor characteristics are the same for the baseline UAS and the UAS with 
ISHM, the model is best used to evaluate the situation where ISHM prognostic/diagnostic 
modules and the information management system would be attached to the existing 
sensors on the baseline UAS. The DOE techniques used in the section are taken from 
Design and Analysis of Experiments by Douglas C. Montgomery and were described in 
detail in Section 2.7 Design of Experiments [2009]. 
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4.4.1 Design of Experiments Test Design 
The first two guidelines, defining the problem and selecting the response variable, have 
been discussed in depth previously in this section. The next step is to identify the design 
factors and their appropriate levels. For this analytic model, there are 14 separate inputs 
that can be used as design factors, as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 - Model Input 
UAS Properties Model Input 
P(Failure) 
Failure Distribution (i.e. Normal); two 
parameters (i.e. µ and σ) 
P(Fault Categories) 
P(Fault Category 1) 
P(Fault Category 2) 
P(Fault Category 3) 
P(Fault Category 4) 
P(Fault Category 5) 
*sum of these probabilities must add to 1 
Average Mission Length tm 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Interval 
tpm 
Expected System Lifetime T 
ISHM Properties Model Input 
Probability of detecting a fault  PD 
Probability of the sensor 
reading a false alarm  
PFA 
Diagnostic Confidence Level DCL 
 
As discussed in Chapter III, several of these factors will be fixed and will be used to 
approximate a typical UAS: failure distribution, tM, tPM, and T. The remaining factors 
then become the design factors and will be varied to investigate their effect on ISHM 
effectiveness. 
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A key factor in DOE is independence in the factors being investigated. This is not 
possible for two groups of the factors: P(Fault Categories), which must sum to one; and 
the sensor characteristics PD and PFA, which are dependent on each other. Instead of using 
all five P(Fault Categories), two will be selected to represent this group. P(Fault Category 
II) and P(Fault Category III) best reflect the difference in how mission success is 
calculated in the model for a UAS with ISHM and for one using current health 
management practices (see Table 9). 
 
The sensor performance characteristics, PD and PFA are determined by Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, which relate true positive fraction to false 
positive fraction. The ROC curve model used in this research is shown in Equation 12 
and is derived from [Moses, 1993]: 
        
  
         
 
where the parameter c ϵ [1,∞] represents the quality of the sensor; as c increases, the 
ROC improves, as c → ∞, the area under the curve approaches unity indicating perfect 
classification. There are many ways to calculate c but for the purposes of this model no 
specific equation will be provided, c will instead represent a general quality. A family of 
ROC curves is presented in Figure 12.  
 
(12) 
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Figure 12 - Family of ROC Curves 
 
To break the dependence on each other, only PD and sensor quality (c) will be evaluated 
for the analysis. 
 
The initial high (+1) and low (-1) discrete settings for each of the seven factors were 
chosen with input from health management Subject Matter Experts at AFRL/RQ and are 
displayed in Table 11. Center points are also included, as they are necessary to check for 
curvature in the response surface. 
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Table 11 - DOE Factor Levels 
Factor 
Discrete Settings 
-1 Center +1 
Weibull - Theta  700 850 1000 
Weibull - Beta 2.5 2.75 3 
Sensor Quality 100 300 500 
PD 0.3 0.6 0.9 
P(Fault Category II) 0.1 0.25 0.4 
P(Fault Category III) 0.1 0.25 0.4 
DCL 0.6 0.75 0.9 
Factor Fixed Settings 
Distribution Weibull 
T 10,000 hrs 
tM 10 hrs 
tPM 1,000 hrs 
 
To test every combination of high/low factors in a factorial design, a 2
7
 design would 
require at least 128 runs, not including the additional center points and any replications. 
With this in mind, a fractional factorial 2
7-4
 Resolution III design with two replicates and 
four center points was chosen, for a total of 28 runs. Each run would also include four 
repeated measurements (i.e., four Monte Carlo trials) for a total of 12 measurements for 
each test point selected. The high number of measurements for each test point was chosen 
due to Excel’s inadequacies at random number generation. Previous research into Excel 
has shown that Excel’s random number generation does not fulfill the basic requirements 
for a random number generator to be used for scientific purposes [McCullough, 2008]. 
Since the model relies on primarily on the random number generator, a large number of 
measurements for each test point will hopefully assuage the number generation problems. 
 
The defining relationship for this experiment was chosen to alias higher order effects and 
focus on the main factors and low-order interactions, following the sparsity of effects 
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principle as discussed in Section 2.7: I = ABD = ACE = BCF = ABCG. For this 
relationship A = Weibull-Theta, B = Weibull-Beta, C = Sensor Quality, D = Probability 
of Detection, E = P(Fault Category II), F = P(Fault Category III) and G = the Diagnostic 
Confidence Level. The full alias structure can be found in Appendix D: Design of 
Experiments Results and Models.  
 
4.4.2 Design of Experiments Results and Conclusions 
The full experiment with test design, results, and statistical analysis can be found in 
Appendix D: Design of Experiments Results and Models. A summary of the results and 
the corresponding conclusions are detailed in this section. The statistical analysis in this 
section was performed using JMP® Version 9.0.1.  
 
One of the main results is that not all of the design factors are significant. Using an F-test, 
only four main factors - Weibull-ϴ, PD, P(Fault Category III), and sensor quality - and 
some low-order interactions were found to significantly affect the response. The 
remaining factors can essentially be ignored when using the model to compare a UAS 
with ISHM and without. Effect tests on the significant factors and interactions can be 
found in Figure 13, the alpha level for the significance tests was 0.05. The model was 
also found to include quadratic terms, in this case Weibull-ϴ * Weibull-ϴ and P(Fault 
Category III)* P(Fault Category III), which indicated a second-order response surface 
model and that some curvature would be seen in the response surface. 
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Figure 13 - Effect Tests on Significant Factors and Interactions 
 
The final model equation, displayed in Equation 13, mapping the response surface was 
determined to be: 
                                                 
                                        
                                    
  
                                               
 
where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated 
for a system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using 
current health management techniques) 
 
From this equation the stationary point is a region of minimum response, clearly visible 
in Figure 14.  
(13) 
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Figure 14 - Response Surface for Analytic Model 
 
While this response surface best illustrates the region were the response is at its 
minimum, or the region where adding ISHM to the UAS baseline would not significantly 
affect mission success rates, there can be some inferences made about the regions that 
maximize the response. By not determining the ISHM performance characteristic (the 
Diagnostic Confidence Level) significant, this evaluation implies that the benefits or 
disadvantages of adding ISHM rely primarily on the performance of the baseline health 
management system. Specifically, that ISHM becomes more beneficial as the baseline 
health management system performs worse. 
 
 
73 
 
Another useful result of this analysis is that the model equation can be used to test if 
adding ISHM to a UAS will statistically affect the mission success rates. This can be 
done using a two-sample t-test, because we can assume that the variance is equal between 
mission success rates calculated for the UAS with ISHM and the UAS without. The t-test 
uses the statistic found in Equation 14 [Montgomery, 2009]: 
   
         
   
 
 
 
where            = the output of the model equation, the difference between the 
number of successful missions calculated for a system without 
ISHM and the same system with ISHM 
   = sample variance.  
n = population size.  
 
The Mean Square Error (MSE) calculated for the model can be used as an estimate of 
sample variance. The sample size used to create the model, in this case 46 trials with four 
repeated measurements for each trial, can be used as the population size. The addition of 
ISHM would be considered statistically significant if        
 
      where   is the level 
of significance. Using the model results detailed in Appendix D and an alpha of 0.05, the 
updated Equation 15 becomes: 
   
         
       
 
   
 
         
      
 
  
 
     
                   
(14) 
(15) 
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Using Equation 12 it can be inferred that if the difference between the expected number 
of successful missions calculated for a system without ISHM and the same system with 
ISHM is greater than 4.726, then the addition of ISHM to the baseline UAS will result in 
a statistically significant difference in mission success rates. Since the mission success 
rate difference is always positive, the addition of ISHM can be considered a beneficial 
addition in terms of mission success rates. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter covered the final products and results from the methodology presented in 
Chapter III. An analytic architecture was created using the Architecture Based Evaluation 
Process and then evaluated using Design of Experiments techniques. Results from the 
evaluation indicated that installing ISHM in existing UAS platforms is only worthwhile, 
in terms of mission effectiveness, when the existing UAS’s health management system 
has significant detection and false alarm problems. The products and model results will 
form the basis of this research effort’s conclusions and recommendations discussed in 
Chapter V. 
(12) 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will answer the research objectives and discuss areas for future research. 
5.2 Research Questions Answered 
The focus of this research effort was to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by 
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any 
current or future autonomous vehicle. To do this, a literature review was conducted to 
answer the following questions, posed initially in Chapter I: 
 
What is the current status of UAS health management? 
The Air Force UAS programs currently use independent sensors incorporated into the 
vehicle’s hardware to monitor for fault indicators on critical subsystems. The sensor data 
is continuously transmitted to ground operations where it is then processed to detect 
anomalies. If the data indicates a fault has occurred the ground operator will execute pre-
determined mitigation steps, dependent on which sensor indicated a fault, and relay a 
message to the maintenance and logistics element. Once the vehicle lands, maintenance 
personnel perform diagnostic tests to confirm the location and identify the type of fault, 
and then perform maintenance actions to restore the component. This is less health 
management than health monitoring, in terms of nomenclature. 
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What are the essential elements of ISHM? 
A typical ISHM system consists of sensors placed at critical components within 
subsystems of the vehicle that stream data to a management system. The management 
system processes the sensor data, executes diagnostic and prognostic algorithms, and then 
feeds this information through a reasoner, as previously displayed in Figure 3. This 
management system can either be on-board the vehicle in a hardware configuration or 
off-board enabling the ground command and control (C2) element. 
 
 
 
Sensors can be conventional or specifically tailored to health management applications. 
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to 
extract fault features. The diagnostic module then analyzes the fault features to detect, 
identify, and isolate developing failure conditions. The diagnostic information will be 
combined with historical data in the prognostic module to generate an estimation of 
failure times. Finally, the diagnostic and prognostic information is turned over to the 
Management System 
On-Board C2 
Figure 3 - Typical ISHM configuration [Benedettini, 2009] 
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reasoner module which analyzes available resources, decides which hazard mitigation 
steps to execute, and then passes the selected decision to the on-board C2 module and 
relays appropriate information to the ground C2 operator and maintenance element 
[Benedettini, 2009]. 
 
What are the expected benefits of ISHM? 
There were five areas that were determined to benefit the most from adding ISHM to 
UAS platforms: rate of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, repair times, operational 
availability, mission success, and cost. With ISHM implemented, the probability of 
unscheduled maintenance should decrease as unscheduled maintenance becomes more 
fault driven and scheduled maintenance intervals can also be investigated for potential 
relaxation or removal. Ideally, the aircraft would replace time-based or event-driven 
maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where maintenance is only 
performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or its 
components [OSAIDD, 1999]. Repair times would decrease as adding prognostic 
technology would result in each subsystem or component having an estimated time to 
failure. Knowing which systems are near failure ahead of time would again allow the 
maintenance element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and 
personnel or order any necessary replacement parts. 
 
Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled 
maintenance from ISHM, the operational availability for each aircraft should improve. 
Another factor affecting operational availability is mission turn-around time, or the time 
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from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM, 
mission turn-around time can include lengthy inspection tests to check for failures. Since 
these tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault 
detection, the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing operational 
availability. Mission success rates would also theoretically increase as having situational 
awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground operations in providing 
full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and due to the fault 
criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer trajectory, ground 
operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the priority targets. 
Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the remaining 
performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to conservatively scrap 
that particular mission set. ISHM can also theoretically expand the flight envelope of the 
aircraft, which could allow for larger mission sets. 
 
The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a 
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a 
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even 
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also 
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. However, there is an inherent 
cost in implementing ISHM, not just to the vehicle but to the resulting operational 
infrastructure. The cost savings must be weighed against the implementation costs to 
truly investigate the financial aspect of ISHM. 
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The answers to the literature review questions were then used to develop an analytic 
architecture that would answer these primary research questions: 
 
What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users? 
With the addition of ISHM, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) move closer to a state of 
true autonomy and less reliance is placed on ground control stations. As with any new 
technology, a phased approach would be appropriate when integrating this technology 
with current practices. 
 
The architecture built for this effort is designed for the initial phase and resembles a state 
of flexible autonomy, where command and control (C2) of the UAS shifts from 
autonomous to operator based on mission phase and particular event conditions. In 
general, ground C2 (as represented by the Operations Control Center in the SV-1) 
commands the vehicle before launch and post landing, and the autonomous C2 takes over 
during the launch sequence and releases command during auto-safing. Currently, the 
ground C2 still maintains significant control through the whole flight, even though the 
autonomous capability is there. ISHM should help to increase the level of autonomy 
within future UAS since ISHM would provide an estimation of the system's current 
abilities to enable real-time decision making by the vehicles C2. If designed for some 
UAS platforms, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, ground C2 would consist of separate 
Launch and Recovery (LRE) and Mission Control Elements (MCE). Also depending on 
the UAS, ground C2 can have the ability to control multiple vehicles at a single time. So 
far, this is not structurally any different from current UAS operations as performed by the 
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United States Air Force. Implementing ISHM into the UAS concept of operations would 
not eliminate any of the current ground C2 infrastructure but would instead require the 
addition of another element, the ISHM Ground Station, whose sole purpose is to monitor 
and verify the decisions made by ISHM. This element would not have personnel attached 
to it, it is instead another computer or set of computers with the more complex algorithms 
that would not be able to stored on the aircraft due to the processing speed limitations. 
ISHM would also affect current users on the ground by potentially increasing the number 
of vehicles that can be controlled at once; with health management handed over to the 
vehicle, ground C2 has the ability to potentially manage more UAS. Additional human 
factors analysis would be completed to determine the maximum amount of vehicles that 
ground C2 can safely control. 
 
Ideally in the next phase (as confidence in ISHM and autonomous technology increases), 
the entire mission from launch to recovery would become fully automated, with ground 
C2 only managing the mission taskings or re-taskings. Ground operations, previously 
managed by multiple elements, such as the LRE, MCE, and ISHM Ground Station, can 
potentially be combined into one center. This could significantly lower the amount of 
personnel needed to operate a UAS. 
 
What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices? 
The end-goal of ISHM is a state of condition-based maintenance, where maintenance is 
only performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or 
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its components [OSAIDD, 1999]. Mirroring the impact on ground control stations, the 
changes to maintenance practices should take a phased approach. 
 
The initial phase of ISHM implementation, as built in the architecture, closely resembles 
current practices. There are still scheduled maintenance intervals; however, by providing 
continuous monitoring and knowing the Estimated Time to Failure for the critical 
components, these intervals have the potential to be relaxed. The other main impact 
would be in the response to faults. Before, time-intensive Built-in Test (BIT) units would 
be used to verify that the fault exists and to pinpoint which component to repair. ISHM 
verifies the fault in flight and provides reams of data to the maintenance element for their 
own verification, negating the use of the BIT unit. Also, by knowing the specific systems 
to be inspected or repaired ahead of time, the maintenance element has time to pre-
position the necessary equipment and personnel or order any necessary replacement parts 
before the UAS has completed its mission.  
 
The next phase would involve upgrading to condition-based maintenance. Scheduled 
maintenance intervals would no longer exist and the entire concept of operations for 
maintenance would become reactionary.   
 
What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect mission 
success? 
A response surface was modeled for a UAS with an expected lifetime of 10,000 hours, 
maintenance interval of 1,000 hours, and average mission length of 10 hours. The final 
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model equation, initially shown in Equation 13, mapping this surface was determined to 
be: 
                                                 
                                        
                                    
         
                                       
 
where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated 
for a system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using 
current health management techniques) 
 
Contour plots for the response surface near this point are provided in Figure 15.  The 
statistical analysis performed in Section 4.4.2 determined that a response greater than 
4.726 indicated a statistically significant difference in mission success rates.  The shaded 
regions on the contour plots indicate areas where ISHM is not beneficial. If the factors 
fall anywhere outside of this region, ISHM should be investigated as a beneficial addition 
to the existing UAS in terms of mission success rates. 
(13) 
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Figure 15 - Contour Plots for Response Surface 
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The architecture also contributed to answering these secondary questions: 
 
How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the presentation change 
in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators, maintenance, etc.)?  
As seen in the OV-2, displayed in Figure 16, there are several types of information that 
are passed from ISHM to ground-level operations: vehicle status, vehicle capabilities, and 
maintenance reports. Additional human factors research will be needed to determine how 
this information is presented to the users; in this architecture there are three main users of 
the data: the Operations Control Center (OCC), the ISHM Ground Station (in the OV-2, 
the OCC and ISHM Ground Station are combined under “Ground Command and 
Control”), and Ground Recovery Operations consisting of maintenance and other launch 
and recovery operations. While maintenance reports are unique to Ground Recovery 
Operations, the OCC and the ISHM Ground Station exploit the vehicle status and 
capabilities differently; consideration of this point must be taken when researching the 
best way to present the data to the personnel of each element. 
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Figure 16 - OV-2 “Operational Node Connectivity Description” 
 
Is ISHM cost effective? 
The main result of the model evaluation indicated that the quality of sensors will affect 
the cost and mission benefits relative to the degree of ISHM implemented on a system.  A 
cursory interpretation of this analysis result infers that decision makers should compare 
 «OV-2» class OV-2 [OV-2]     
Vehicle Management System
Integrated Systems Health Management
Ground Command and Control Ground Recov ery Operations
«System»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Information Management System
«Subsystem»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Prognostic/Diagnostic
Vehicle Status, Vehicle Capabilities
«Needline»
Maintenance Reports
«Needline»
Vehicle Status, Mititgation
Actions, Vehicle Capabilities
«Needline»
Health Status, Fault Detection, IMS Commands
«Needline»
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the cost and mission benefits of upgrading the sensors with the cost and benefits of 
implementing ISHM; however, a complete cost and mission benefit analysis should be 
completed before making any conclusions and will require a more in-depth ISHM model 
than that presented in this paper. The model presented in this research effort lays the 
foundation to develop the more in-depth model. 
 
While no cost data was included in the model, the output from the model can be also used 
when evaluating the total financial benefit of ISHM. By putting a cost on an average 
unscheduled maintenance action, the expected number of maintenance actions, as output 
by the model, for a UAS without ISHM and one with ISHM can be compared. The model 
can also be used to determine the effect of longer scheduled maintenance intervals on 
expected unscheduled maintenance actions for a UAS with ISHM. The cost saved by 
having longer scheduled maintenance intervals can be added to the financial evaluation 
for decision makers. 
 
The expected mission success rate can also be used to decide whether ISHM is cost 
effective. There is a cost associated with preparing a UAS for launch and with the 
recovery actions once the UAS has landed. If a UAS would have to curtail its mission or 
cancel it entirely because of health management issues, another UAS would be tasked to 
complete the mission, and could incur additional launch and recovery costs if it had to be 
launched from scratch. The expected mission success rate for a UAS with ISHM and for 
one without ISHM could be quantified as an expected cost per mission and then 
compared for evaluation by decision makers.   
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5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
There are numerous opportunities for further research into this aspect of Integrated 
System Health Management. A large benefit to the research would be lifting some of the 
assumptions under which the analytic model operates. One large assumption is that the 
scheduled maintenance intervals act as a renewal process; this is not close to reality, as 
the system will degrade over time, even with adequate maintenance intervals. A second 
model assumption follows along the same lines, only in this case assuming that there are 
no sensor degradation effects over the lifetime of the vehicle. Over time, the probability 
of detection for the sensor will decrease and/or the probability of a false alarm will 
increase. Another large assumption is that ISHM uses the same sensor suite that is 
currently in the baseline UAS; following the results of the FMECA, ISHM would 
actually supplement the original health management or monitoring system with additional 
sensors and effectors. The model should be updated to reflect these changes; this will 
give a more accurate representation of the reliability and health management aspects of 
the baseline UAS. 
 
Much of this research effort used theoretical values when evaluating the model and 
mapping the response surface. If actual failure data for current UAS platforms or 
information becomes available for commercially-implemented ISHM systems, this 
information can be fed into the model and the response surface can be re-evaluated. 
Large ranges were used for the theoretical values to try and cover a variety of potential 
UAS platforms and ISHM systems; this leads to potential model inadequacy because 
local maximum and minimum ridges may not have been discovered. Actual ISHM 
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performance data will hopefully give much smaller ranges and a more robust response 
surface can be determined. 
5.4 Summary 
In this research effort, an analytic architecture was created to help determine the effect 
ISHM had on mission success rates for a UAS. The final products revealed that, for 
mission success rates only, ISHM is beneficial in situations where the theoretical UAS 
has serious problems with detection and false alarm rates. Using representative data for a 
UAS, the analysis determined that the failure distribution parameters, sensor quality 
(which determines the relationship between probability of detection and probability of 
false alarm), and probability of an imminent fault during a mission were significant to the 
model. The result of the model determined that ISHM can result in a significant 
improvement on mission assurance, especially when implemented with higher quality 
sensors and on vehicles where the probability of imminent failure is higher relative to the 
mission times and time between preventative maintenance.  This appears consistent with 
the premise that ISHM can support an extension of preventative maintenance intervals 
with an attendant reduction in sustainment cost.  
 
It is important to note that the analytic model had several broad assumptions that affect 
these conclusions: (1) the model assumed that ISHM would use the same sensor suite that 
is currently in the baseline UAS – this does not reflect reality, ISHM would have 
additional sensors and effectors based on the results of the FMECA, resulting in a 
different PD and PFA; (2) the model is limited to detecting faults that the current system is 
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looking for – theoretically, ISHM would gather data over the lifetime of the vehicle to 
supplement these fault states as new information becomes available; (3) the model does 
not allow for system or sensor degradation – this negates a lot of the benefits provided by 
prognostics. Additional analysis is needed to further study the effect of ISHM on mission 
effectiveness. These results should also be taken as just one part of the “big picture” of 
ISHM, and should be weighed against the other benefits that ISHM provides. 
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Appendix A: Architecture-Based Evaluation Process (ABEP) 
1. Design Operations Concept of system to be evaluated.  
Ops concept provides the system description which the architecture will model, 
and the models will simulate/evaluate.  
 
2. Identify Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) relevant to the decision/evaluation  
Identify the metrics that represent the effectiveness of the system.  
3. Identify required level of abstraction for architecture to show traceability to 
MOE’s  
Analyze the Ops Concept to determine if MOE’s are measured at the output of the 
system, within the system (requiring ‘drilling’ into the system activities), or at the 
output of activities external to the system (requiring external systems diagram)  
 
4. Identify architecture views necessary to capture structure/relationships  
a. Structure (OV-1, OV-2, and OV-5) In order to first develop the structure of the 
analysis, nearly all evaluations will require the OV-1 (High Level 
Operations Concept), OV-2 (Operational Node Connectivity Description), 
and OV-5 Operational Activity Model views. The level of abstraction (A-
1, A-0, AO etc.) of the OV-5 is initially identified in the previous step.  
b. Decision Logic (OV-6a) to capture the logic of the system, nearly all 
evaluations will require the OV-6a Rules Model, developed to match the 
level of abstraction used for the OV-5’s.  
c. As Required: SV-2, SV-4, SV-7,OV-6b, OV-6c Depending on the complexity, 
consideration for time and dependency on internal performance inputs, 
some or all of the listed views may be required. 
  
5. Develop architecture views 
Develop architecture views in accordance with DODAF to include all relevant 
activities and entities. If an integrated architecture already exists, then acquire the 
required architecture views.  
 
6. Develop Modeling Simulation to replicate architecture  
a. Select Modeling tool best suited to meet evaluation requirements (i.e. Excel 
spreadsheet vs. discrete model simulation program)  
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b. Model structure to match architecture (OV-2, OV-5)  
c. Model decision logic to match OV-6a.  
d. Calculate MOE‟s at output of activities as functions of design parameters  
 
7. Evaluate Model Completeness  
Does model consider all relevant aspects (processes, assumptions, input variables 
and outputs, MOE‟s) of the system/concept?  
 
a. If so, continue to step 8.  
b. If model not complete, return to step 3 with the following considerations.  
i. Determine additional architecture view and/or level of abstraction 
required to achieve traceability between system and the missing 
aspect.  
ii. Develop required additional architecture  
iii. Modify model to include additional architecture view.  
iv. Re-evaluate Step 7 until model captures all relevant aspects of the 
concept.  
 
8. Evaluate model for MOE results, requirements and key parameters  
a. Once the model is complete, evaluate the system’s ability to meet target 
metrics.  
b. Vary design parameters and perform sensitivity analysis to identify key 
parameters.  
c. Compare sensitivity analysis to target MOE’s to establish requirements and 
KPPs.  
d. Identify critical performance parameters in the SV-7 Systems Performance 
Parameters Matrix.  
e. Vary system design and design parameters to evaluate the system’s robustness 
and its rate of degradation. 
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Appendix B: ISHM Architecture 
B.1 Integrated System Health Management Concept of Operations 
1.0 Purpose 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) adds a centralized health management 
system that is responsible for collecting and processing health status information from 
across a system during all mission phases. ISHM balances data flow from multiple sub-
systems and produces the information necessary to identify current system capabilities, 
provide situational awareness to mission and ground operations, and quickly identify 
contingencies for improved vehicle control and mission decisions. In order to be 
effective, ISHM must have the capability to: assess vehicle state; reliably detect, 
diagnose, and predict failures and degraded conditions; derive and relay accurate vehicle 
health status to the ground operations crew, maintainers, and the on-flight vehicle 
command and control module. These capabilities would allow the operator or vehicle to 
re-plan the mission, reconfigure flight control and continue, or abort as necessary in real-
time. 
 
2.0 Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks 
This section discusses the time horizon for the future of ISHM, and the assumptions and 
risks overlaying the use of ISHM. 
 
2.1 Time Horizon 
In the near term (0-10 yrs), ISHM is envisioned to provide condition-based maintenance, 
remaining life-quantification, mission-readiness decision making, and improved fault 
isolation and detection to the operator.  
 
In the far term (10+ yrs), as systems reach for true autonomy, ISHM will enable an 
autonomous vehicle to re-plan its own mission based on actual system health and 
capabilities, collaborate with other autonomous vehicles to ensure mission and capability 
coverage, and define its own operating envelope. 
 
2.2 Assumptions 
(1) The ISHM system will currently have no command or control over the 
autonomous vehicle; it only provides recommended actions for flight control 
and ground control. 
 
2.3 Risks 
(1) If ISHM lacks integrity, the false alarm rate will increase the probability of 
unscheduled maintenance over current health monitoring systems. 
(2) The added weight of an ISHM system will decrease the capability of the system. 
(3) The added cost of an ISHM could outweigh the benefits of the system. 
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(4) If ISHM is less reliable than the vehicle, the probability of unscheduled 
maintenance will increase over current health monitoring systems. 
 
3.0 Description of the Military Challenge  
In 2010, the United States Air Force (USAF) released the results of a year-long study 
highlighting the need for increasing autonomy in modern weapon systems, especially in 
the domain of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The study identified the need for greater 
system autonomy as the “single greatest theme” for future USAF Science and 
Technology investments. [Technology Horizons, 2010] Current technology 
advancements have brought the USAF to a state of flexible autonomy, which involves 
dynamically shifting command and control (C2) from autonomous to operator based on 
workload, system health, and the perceived intent of the operator. 
 
One of the key attributes sustaining flexible autonomy is the ability of the UAS to detect, 
isolate, and diagnose system health problems to relay back to ground C2, the on-board 
flight control module, and maintainers for appropriate action. Current flight avionics 
architectures may include lower level sub-system health monitoring or may isolate health 
monitoring functions to a black box configuration, but a vehicle-wide health monitoring 
information system has seldom been implemented.  
 
4.0 Synopsis 
ISHM provides the basis for integrating all the individual system’s health management 
inputs and outputs (I/O) on a particular vehicle and determines, in real-time, the vehicle’s 
health status and mission capabilities. The overall desired effect of an ISHM system 
would be an increase in mission success rates, driven by improved operational 
availability, increased health awareness, faster turnaround times, and false alarm 
avoidance. In order to perform this capability, ISHM must provide continuous monitoring 
over the entirety of the vehicle, identify that a fault has occurred, pinpoint the fault 
mechanism and its location, assess and assign a level of health to the vehicle, and relay 
selected fault data to the ground operator for action. 
 
5.0 Desired Effects 
The overall desired effect of an ISHM system would be to detect and isolate either a real-
time fault or pre-cursers to a fault, determine the criticality of the fault, and then relay the 
appropriate information back to ground control for action. Benefits of this capability are 
discussed in the remaining sub-sections. 
 
5.1 Effect on Scheduled and Unscheduled Maintenance 
The Air Force goal for prognostic systems such as ISHM is to completely eliminate 
traditional aircraft inspection and repair patterns. [Ross, 1999] Currently, a 
malfunctioning unit is either identified in-flight (based off an alert from an individual 
sensor) or identified through scheduled inspections. There are an inherent probability of a 
false alarm and a probability of fault detection, meaning that the aircraft could be 
incorrectly pulled from an on-going mission or could continue on a mission with an 
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unknown fault that could lead to system failure. The integrated aspect of ISHM proposes 
to severely reduce the false alarm rate and increase the total probability of detection, as 
understanding the full health status of the vehicle can identify false positives and identify 
if a fault or failure has occurred down-stream. For example: a sensor falsely identifies a 
valve stuck closed, a sensor further down the stream indicates a normal flow rate and the 
system has not lost any performance aspects; ISHM would therefore not report this as a 
fault.  
With the continuous monitoring provided by ISHM, pre-cursors to faults can also be 
identified and an Estimated Time to Failures of the component or total system will be 
reported. Additionally, if multiple mission data is stored, every time a fault occurs, the 
data collected by ISHM can be used to identify new indicators or pre-cursors to a failure 
to be uploaded into the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms.  
The overall result is that with ISHM implemented, the probability of unscheduled 
maintenance should be minimized and scheduled maintenance intervals can be relaxed or 
removed. Ideally with ISHM, the aircraft would replace time-based or event-driven 
maintenance with a condition-based maintenance system, where maintenance is only 
performed based on objective evidence of actual or predictable failure of a system or its 
components. [OSAIDD, 1999] 
5.2 Decreased Mean Time to Repair 
Current fault detection is limited to identifying the occurrence of a fault and an 
approximate location, meaning that fault isolation can only occur after the aircraft has 
landed. There is also a probability that the mechanic can even correctly identify the 
failure mode once it lands. With ISHM, both fault detection and isolation are performed 
in-flight, within a specified confidence level, and the appropriate information is relayed 
to the maintenance element. This gives the maintenance element time to pre-position the 
necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order any necessary replacement 
parts, severely reducing the total Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) after an event.  
As a result of its continuous monitoring, ISHM would also reduce maintenance time 
during scheduled inspections. Prognostics would, theoretically, calculate an Estimated 
Time to Failure (ETF) for each component, resulting in each inspection only focusing on 
those systems that had passed an ETF threshold in that time interval. Knowing that the 
specific systems to be inspected ahead of time would again allow the maintenance 
element time to pre-position the necessary maintenance equipment and personnel or order 
any necessary replacement parts. ISHM would also negate the current use of time-
intensive Built-in Test (BIT) units, as each system would be continuously tested. 
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5.3 Operational Availability Improvement 
Based on the decreased downtime in unscheduled maintenance and scheduled 
maintenance from ISHM, the Operational Availability for each aircraft should improve. 
Another factor affecting Operational Availability is mission turn-around time, or the time 
from when the aircraft lands to when it is ready for the next mission. Without ISHM, 
mission turn-around time can include lengthy BIT tests to check for failures, since these 
tests are not needed with continuous monitoring and a higher confidence in fault 
detection the mission turn-around time should decrease, increasing Operational 
Availability. Whether measured in maintenance downtime or a reduction in hours 
required for testing and diagnostics, etc., the net result is that a system with ISHM will be 
available for use more of the time. 
5.4 Increased Mission Success 
Having situational awareness of the entire health state of the vehicle assists ground 
operations in providing full mission coverage. If a UAS autonomously detects a fault and 
due to the fault criticality (for example, low fuel levels) decides to re-task to a closer 
trajectory, ground operations can re-task other UAS vehicles to ensure coverage of the 
priority targets. Without ISHM, a fault alert would generally give no indication of the 
remaining performance capability of the UAS, leaving ground operations to 
conservatively scrap that particular mission set.  
An additional aspect of increased situational awareness is its affect on UAS flight limits. 
Modern autonomous flight control systems limit the vehicle to safe operating loads and 
environments; this operating envelope is pre-defined and very conservative. With ISHM, 
the flight envelope can theoretically be expanded and defined by the design criteria for 
the vehicle. Health data would then be used to restrict the envelope to a prescribed level 
in the event of a detected fault. This would increase the operational capability of the 
vehicle, allowing for larger mission sets. Improved situational awareness combined with 
the theoretical improved Operational Availability would greatly improve the rate of 
mission success. 
5.5 Cost Savings 
The previous benefits all have some measure of cost savings attached to them. Having a 
lower total maintenance downtime, due to decreases in scheduled maintenance and a 
lower probability of unscheduled maintenance, leads to a lower personnel cost and even 
an option of having less maintenance personnel needed. Fewer maintenance actions also 
indicate a potential reduction in spares and supply costs. The on-board test diagnostics 
provided by ISHM would also theoretically replace some ground test equipment, as it 
would become redundant. 
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6.0 Necessary Capabilities 
The capabilities necessary for ISHM to be effective are appropriate data and information 
management, fault detection and isolation, the ability to assess the health status of the 
UAS, and communication, both internal and external to the system. 
 
6.1 Data Management 
The ISHM system must provide continuous monitoring over the entirety of the vehicle. 
Sensors are placed in critical locations in order to feed information on the state of the 
system. Sensors can be conventional, measuring temperature, speed, and flow rate, or 
specifically tailored to health management applications, such as strain gauges, ultrasonic 
sensors, or proximity devices. 
 
Data Management also includes parameter sets, vehicle configuration, and a data store 
with a list of safe states associated with known fault events and mitigation steps. Current 
mission sensor data and event recording can either be kept in an on-board data storage 
system sent to ground as required, or continuously streamed to ground control. 
 
6.2 Fault Detection 
The sensor data is then processed to remove any artifacts or noises and manipulated to 
extract fault features (either current or pre-cursers) and provide a comprehensive system 
picture. Fault Detection combines diagnostic information with historical data (prognostic 
reasoning) to generate an estimation of failure times. These fault indications are then 
sorted, prioritized, and distributed to insure action within time to criticality. Algorithms 
developed for diagnostic and prognostic calculations are generally based on mathematical 
models (e.g. Hamilton dynamic, Lagrangian dynamic, approximation methods), or 
pattern recognition (e.g. fuzzy-logic, statistical/regression methods, neural network 
clustering). 
 
6.3 Fault Isolation 
After identifying that a fault has occurred, ISHM must pinpoint the fault mechanism (i.e. 
the specific cause of failure) and its location. If not identifiable through prognostic 
reasoning, common fault mechanisms for that location can be identified using historical 
failure data. 
 
6.4 Health State Assessment 
ISHM must have the capability to assess and assign levels of health to the vehicle. This is 
achieved by calculating the remaining vehicle capabilities based on a capability model 
and the current fault state of the system. A notional capability model is hierarchically 
based, where the higher-level capability is computed using the values of the lower-level 
capabilities and a mathematical expression. Faults are quantified at the lowest level with 
system-level capability computations that orient this data with mission requirements to 
determine effects on the vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
6.5 Select Mitigation Procedures 
The ISHM system will provide mitigation procedures in the event of a known fault for 
the on-board flight control to act on if necessary. In order perform this capability, ISHM 
will a) examine the available resources to determine any performance limitations and to 
estimate the time to criticality; b) confirm the diagnosed event and declare it to be a valid 
vehicle event with a high confidence level; c) access the fault data store for the 
appropriate safe state and the feasible step alternatives; before d) selecting the action 
steps that allow completion within the criticality time and performance limitations. These 
action procedures will then be sent to the on-board flight control and to ground control. 
Since ISHM is deterministic and operates only on known faults and known mitigations, 
any unknown fault will immediately be assigned a critical level of health and the aircraft 
will automatically return to base.  
 
6.6 Communication 
The ISHM must be able to send and receive messages internally and externally to the 
vehicle. 
 
7.0 Enabling Capabilities 
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on 
the vehicle prior to ISHM being implemented. This is an iterative process that identifies 
failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on the system, 
isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative measures. The 
results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components where sensors 
need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation, and assign 
criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes. 
 
8.0 Sequenced Actions 
There are three main use cases for ISHM: no faults occur, a fault event occurs real-time, 
and pre-cursors to a fault are identified. See Appendix 11.1 for key nomenclature 
definitions. 
 
8.1 Nominal Operations 
The ISHM system will be continuously monitoring the health state of the UAS and will 
communicate either continuously or on set intervals (barring a fault event) the health 
status of the UAS. ISHM will also be continuously calculating an Estimated Time to 
Failures for every monitored component. 
 
8.2 Real-Time Fault Event 
Once a failure occurs, the following actions should take place: 
(1) ISHM locates the fault and identifies the failure mode 
(2) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health 
status to the appropriate level 
(3) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle  
(4) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures, 
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits. 
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(5) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the 
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element 
 a. The on-board flight control can: 
  (i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)   
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or reshape the 
current trajectory  
b.   The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the criticality 
of the event, can: 
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within its new 
capability 
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision  
c.   The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate 
 
8.3 Pre-Cursor to Fault is Detected 
When a pre-cursor to a fault is detected, the following actions should take place: 
(1) ISHM locates the affected component and identifies the impending failure 
mode 
(2) ISHM calculates an Estimated Time to System (or Component) Failure 
(3) ISHM assigns a criticality to the fault mode and adjusts the vehicle’s health 
status to the appropriate level 
(4) ISHM evaluates the new capability of the vehicle  
(5) ISHM selects appropriate, deterministic, mitigation action procedures, 
correlating them with mission and vehicle inhibits. 
(6) ISHM sends the action procedures to the on-board flight control, and alerts the 
Ground Operator and the Maintenance element 
 a. The on-board flight control can: 
  (i) Continue on current trajectory (ignore ISHM)   
(ii) Use recommendations to autonomously reconfigure and/or reshape the 
current trajectory  
b.   The Ground Operator, as appropriate and in accordance with the criticality 
of the event, can: 
(i) Override the on-board flight control decision and re-task within its new 
capability 
(ii) Defer to the autonomous on-board flight control decision  
c.   The Maintenance element executes maintenance actions as appropriate 
 
9.0 Command Relationships 
ISHM will have no command and control over the UAS at this time. The ISHM system 
will need to communicate with the following systems/subsystems: 
 
9.1 Ground Control 
Ground systems are normally treated as separate systems, and their relationship to the 
vehicle has typically been one of controller and operator; in this case, ground is 
hierarchically superior to the vehicle and commands it. For events that happen during a 
mission, the ground will take control to determine the needed actions and then send the 
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commands to the vehicle for execution. The vehicle interfaces with ground control to 
capture, analyze, and preserve vehicle health data.  
 
Vehicle control transitions between ground and on-board depending on mission phase 
and particular event conditions:  
 Before Launch 
o Ground is master 
o Control transitions to vehicle during launch sequence 
 During Flight 
o Vehicle is master (autonomous) 
o Ground monitors via downlink telemetry 
o Ground takes control when appropriate  
 Post Landing 
o Ground is master (after auto-safing) 
 
9.2 Maintenance and Logistics 
Maintenance and Logistics can be considered part of ground control (under the 
overarching domain of “Operations Control Center”) or a separate system entirely. Their 
relationship to the vehicle is either reactionary or scheduled and does not consist of a 
hierarchical relationship.  
 
Interactions: 
 Scheduled Maintenance: Based on flight hours and is performed at either the 
base-level or at a depot. Collected historical data from ISHM monitoring can be 
used to highlight components that need to be inspected. 
 Unscheduled Maintenance: Initiated when a fault has been discovered. Once the 
ISHM has detected an anomaly, the appropriate data is sent to Maintenance and 
Logistic for action. 
 Post Mission: Degradation and non-critical fault information are sent to 
Maintenance and Logistics to improve vehicle turn-around time. 
 
9.3 Vehicle Systems 
ISHM collects status and event snapshots from the vehicle subsystems and processes the 
information using various health algorithms and reasoning capabilities. 
 
9.4 On-Board Flight Control 
The on-board flight control receives command to execute an action from ISHM generated 
by either ISHM and/or ground C2. The autonomous on-board flight control will 
decompose these decisions and action lists into a set of commands and send them to the 
appropriate systems for execution. On-board flight control schedules these tasks 
accordingly in order to complete in the prescribed time.  
 
As a vehicle system, on-board flight control health status, events, time, and mission 
information are continuously sent to ISHM. ISHM in turn continuously provides the 
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vehicle system health assessments, vehicle capability, and mitigation actions 
predetermined for particular anomalies. 
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B.2 Architecture Concept of Operations 
 
1.0 Purpose 
The focus of this research is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by 
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any 
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture capabilities will include the ability 
to analyze the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the 
performance of the processor, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring 
sensors) to mission performance. The architecture is aimed at primarily answering the 
following questions: 
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users? 
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices? 
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect 
mission success? 
 
The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions: 
(1) How should the ISHM data be presented?  
(2) Is ISHM cost effective? 
 
2.0 Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks 
This section discusses the time horizon for the architecture, the assumptions overlaying 
the architecture, and the risks inherent in using this architecture and analysis tool. 
 
2.1 Time Horizon 
The architecture and preliminary analysis should be built and completed by December of 
2012 with the project out-brief scheduled for March of 2013. Additional interim gates 
will be established as the project progresses. 
 
2.2 Assumptions 
At this point in ISHM development: 
(1) This architecture does not analyze ISHM past the system level; however, the 
architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems 
that are of value to the researcher. 
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or 
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state 
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The 
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as 
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or 
direct mitigation actions as necessary. 
2.3 Risks 
(1) If the selected metrics for analysis either do not accurately describe ISHM or 
are not independent of each other, the optimization process will give an 
analysis that does not appropriately model the system.  
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3.0 Description of the Military Challenge  
ISHM is currently being considered for implementation in unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) for the United States Air Force. Before the USAF can move forward, the effects 
of ISHM both on-ground and in-flight need to be understood and evaluated. This project 
intends to perform an in-depth analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of adding an 
ISHM system to general or specific UAS through the use of DODAF architecture and 
optimization processes. 
 
4.0 Synopsis 
This concept intends to perform an in-depth analysis on the advantages and disadvantages 
of adding an ISHM system to a general or specific UAS through the use of architecture. 
The architecture will have the capability to optimize a given ISHM’s fault detection rate, 
fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and calculate the mean time to repair, mean 
time between failure, probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled 
maintenance, and turn-around time for a UAS with ISHM.  To use the architecture and 
analysis tool, the user will select desired metrics, modify the system’s objectives and 
constraints, input the results of the Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis, 
integrate the ISHM architecture into the overall system architecture, execute the analysis, 
and then perform sensitivity analysis on the results. 
 
5.0 Desired Effects 
This architecture should provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over 
any autonomous vehicle and to quantify the effect of ISHM on the operational 
availability and mission success rate by comparing them to current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities. The architecture should have the capability to optimize the ISHM fault 
detection rate, fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and the expected weight of 
the ISHM. The architecture should have the capability to use those optimized rates to 
calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM: mean time between failures (MTBF), 
probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled maintenance, 
operational availability, and the probability of mission success. 
 
6.0 Necessary Capabilities 
The capabilities necessary to use the ISHM architecture are that the architecture is 
flexible, supports analysis and optimization, and is easy to use. 
 
6.1 Flexible 
The architecture should have the capability to be modified to fit any UAS baseline 
architecture. This architecture should also have the capability to be expanded on for 
future generations of UAS and ISHM technologies. 
 
6.2 Analysis and Optimization 
This architecture should have the capability to support an evaluation model. The 
particular modeling or analytical tools (such as spreadsheets or discrete event simulation, 
or through a simulation software product such as ARENA) can be chosen by the user. 
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6.3 Ease of Use 
The architecture and analysis process should be straightforward and clear. Any user that 
has some prior knowledge of ISHM and DoDAF architecture should have the ability to 
understand the architecture and perform some level of modification as appropriate and 
appreciate its use as an analysis tool. 
 
7.0 Enabling Capabilities 
In order to operate the architecture, a Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis must 
be performed, and the overall architecture of the system must be built. 
 
7.1 Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis 
A formal Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on 
the UAS prior to using this ISHM architecture. This is an iterative process that identifies 
failure modes, assesses their probabilities of occurrence and their effects on the system, 
isolating their causes, and determining corrective action or preventative measures. The 
results of the FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components where sensors 
need to be applied, guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithm creation, and assign 
criticality to failure modes for health assessment purposes. 
 
7.2 UAS Architecture 
The architecture for the overall system for which ISHM is going to be analyzed should be 
should be built prior to using this lower level ISHM architecture; the intent of the lower 
level ISHM architecture is to be integrated into the overall system architecture. The 
following metrics from the baseline vehicle should be collected for use in the 
architecture: Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), MTBF, rate of scheduled maintenance, 
probability of unscheduled maintenance, operational availability, and the probability of 
mission success. 
 
8.0 Sequenced Actions 
To execute the architecture, take the following steps: 
(1) Select Metrics: Select the metrics that the user is interested in for analysis. 
(2) Modify Objectives and Constraints: Modify the selected objectives and 
constraints to reflect the metrics that the user is interested in. 
(3) Input results of FMECA: Enter in the failure data for each subsystem as a 
parametric distribution. Assign criticality to identified failure modes. 
(4) Modify the Architecture: Integrate the ISHM architecture into the overall 
system architecture. Use the results of the FMECA to highlight the critical 
systems that need to be monitored and determine the number of sensors to be 
implemented in each system. 
(5) Execute Analysis 
(6) Perform Sensitivity Analysis. 
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B.3 AV-1 
 
1.0 Architectural Description 
Previous generation health monitoring technology was typically local to a given 
subsystem; the next generation, Integrated System Health Management (ISHM), adds a 
centralized health management system to a typical flight avionics configuration. It is 
responsible for collecting and processing vehicle health status information from across 
the vehicle during all mission phases.  As a consequence it will enhance the ability to 
make on-board decisions, thus migrating strict ground control to shared vehicle 
autonomy. ISHM performs health management at the vehicle- and mission-level from 
events and diagnostics gathered at the subsystem level.  
 
ISHM is currently being considered for implementation in unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) for the United States Air Force (USAF). Before the USAF can move forward, the 
effects of ISHM both on-ground and in-flight need to be understood and evaluated. The 
focus of this architecture is to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM by 
constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities, and to provide a general baseline model that can be implemented over any 
current or future autonomous vehicle. The architecture capabilities will include the ability 
to analyze the causal relationship of ISHM performance metrics (to include the 
performance of the processor, and the performance and reliability of the monitoring 
sensors) to mission performance. 
 
2.0 Scope  
The architecture is aimed at primarily answering the following questions: 
(1) What are the potential impacts to ground control stations and users? 
(2) What are the potential impacts on current maintenance practices? 
(3) What are the performance characteristics necessary for ISHM to effect 
mission success? 
 
The architecture should also contribute to answering these secondary questions: 
(1) How should ISHM data be presented to be effective? How will the 
presentation change in regards to the different users of ISHM (operators, 
maintenance, etc.)?  
 (2) Is ISHM cost effective? 
 
2.1 Architectural Views and Products Contained 
This architecture contains Operational and System views. 
 
The Operational views include a High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) to 
graphically describe the operational concept, an Operational Resource Flow Description 
(OV-2) to describe the resource flows exchanged between operational activities, and 
Operational Activity Models (OV-5a and OV-5b) to describe the relationships, inputs, 
and outputs between operational activities. These Operational views model the static 
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structure of the architectural elements and their relationships.  An additional Operational 
view that describes dynamic behavior is the Operational Rules Model (OV-6a), which 
defines operational procedures and constraints. 
 
The planned system view is the Systems Interface Description (SV-1), which identifies 
systems, system items, and their interconnections.  
 
2.2 Project Timeline 
The architecture and preliminary analysis should be built and completed by December of 
2012 with the project out-brief scheduled for March of 2013. Additional interim gates 
will be established as the project progresses. 
 
3.0 Purpose and Perspective  
The purpose of the architecture is to provide a general baseline model that can be 
implemented over any autonomous vehicle and to quantify the effect of ISHM on the 
operational availability and mission success rate by comparing them to current 
autonomous vehicle capabilities. The architecture should have the capability to optimize 
the ISHM fault detection rate, fault isolation coverage rate, false alarm rate, and the 
expected weight of the ISHM. The architecture should have the capability to use those 
optimized rates to calculate these metrics for a UAS with ISHM: mean time between 
failures (MTBF), probability of scheduled maintenance, probability of unscheduled 
maintenance, operational availability, and the probability of mission success. 
 
4.0 Tools and File Formats Used 
The architecture will be built in Enterprise Architect v8.0 (student) and presented in three 
formats: Word documents, HTML reports, and XML data files. 
 
5.0 Assumptions and Constraints 
This section includes assumptions and constraints needed to understand the architecture 
and its intended usage. 
 
5.1 Assumptions 
(1) Cost will not be evaluated 
(2) At this point in ISHM development, the ISHM system has no command or 
control over the autonomous vehicle. ISHM in its current technology state 
only provides recommended actions based on the type of fault it detects. The 
vehicle’s autonomous management system will prioritize actions as 
necessary or, if there is time, a ground-based ISHM team can overrule or 
direct mitigation actions as necessary. 
 
5.2 Constraints 
In order to make a general baseline model, it is not possible to represent every possible 
aspect of ISHM. Therefore this architecture will not analyze ISHM past the system level; 
however, the architecture can be easily modified to include components and subsystems 
that are of value to the researcher. 
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6.0 Supporting Analysis 
Representative data for a UAS will be fed into the model and Design of Experiments 
(DOE) techniques will be used to determine situations where ISHM can be effectively 
used. The response for this analysis is the difference between the number of successful 
missions calculated for a system without ISHM (i.e. using current health management 
techniques) and a system with ISHM. The intent is to explore the response surface where 
this difference is maximized, which coincides with the operational area where ISHM 
would be most beneficial. 
 
7.0 Findings  
A response surface was modeled for a UAS with an expected lifetime of 10,000 hours, 
maintenance interval of 1,000 hours, and average mission length of 10 hours. The final 
model equation mapping this surface was determined to be: 
 
                                                       
                                                        
                                                      
        
 
where y is the difference between the number of successful missions calculated for a 
system with ISHM and the same system without ISHM (i.e. using current health 
management techniques) 
 
Contour plots for the response surface near this point are provided in the figures below. 
The statistical analysis determined that a response greater than 4.726 indicated a 
statistically significant difference in mission success rates.  The shaded regions on the 
contour plots indicate areas where ISHM is not beneficial. If the factors fall anywhere 
outside of this region, ISHM should be investigated as a beneficial addition to the 
existing UAS in terms of mission success rates. 
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B.4 OV-1 
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B.5 OV-2 
 
  
 «OV-2» class OV-2 [OV-2]     
Vehicle Management System
Integrated Systems Health Management
Ground Command and Control Ground Recov ery Operations
«System»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Information Management System
«Subsystem»
Integrated Systems Health Management::
Prognostic/Diagnostic
Vehicle Status, Vehicle Capabilities
«Needline»
Maintenance Reports
«Needline»
Vehicle Status, Mititgation
Actions, Vehicle Capabilities
«Needline»
Health Status, Fault Detection, IMS Commands
«Needline»
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B.6 OV-5a 
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B.7 OV-5b 
 
 
 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Nominal Mission Operations]     
Mission Start
«OperationalActiv ity»
Receiv e Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
Process Sensor Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
Store Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
Package Data
«OperationalActiv ity»
Transmit Data
Mission
Complete
Fault Detected?
Time for
Heartbeat?
Mission Complete?
Fault
Detected
During
Mission
Or
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
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 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Fault During Mission]     
Information Management System (System Level) Prognostic/Diagnostic Modules (Subsystem Level)
Fault Detected During Mission
«OperationalActiv ity»
Confirm Fault Occurred
Fault(s)
Confirmed?
«OperationalActiv ity»
Determine Type of Fault
«OperationalActiv ity»
Pinpoint Fault Location
«OperationalActiv ity»
Calculate Estimated Time 
to Failure
«OperationalActiv ity»
Assign CriticalityMore than One
Fault Detected?
«OperationalActiv ity»
Prioritize Faults
«OperationalActiv ity»
Recommend Mitigation 
Actions
Fault Category
< 5?
Mission Start
Vehicle Retired
«OperationalActiv ity»
Ev aluate Current 
Capabilities
Fault Category
<4?
Mission
Complete
No
Faults
Left to
Analyze
[No]
All Faults Accounted For
Yes
Yes Yes
No
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 «OV-5» act OV-5 [OV-5b Lifetime Operations]     
Vehicle
Placed in
Service
Scheduled
Maintenance
Required?
Unscheduled
Maintenance
Required?
Vehicle at end of
Life?
«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Scheduled 
Maintenance
«OperationalActiv ity»
Perform Unscheduled 
Maintenance
OR
Vehicle
Retired
«OperationalActiv ity»
Prepare Vehicle for 
Mission
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
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B.8 OV-6a 
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B.9 SV-1 
  
 «SV-1» composite structure SV-1 [SV-1]     
Vehicle SubSystem/Component Level
Vehicle System Level
Ground Systems
On-board ISHM
«System»
Information Management System
«System»
Sensors
«System»
Operational Control Center
«System»
Ground Operations
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Maintenance Operations
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Recov ery/Safing
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Vehicle Checkout
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Logistics
«Subsystem»
Ground Operations::Launch Operations
«System»
Prognostic/Diagnostic Module
«Subsystem»
Information Management System::Reasoner
«System»
Effectors
«System»
Vehicle Management System
«System»
Communication
«System»
Integrated System Health Management 
Ground Station
«SystemInterface»
«SystemInterface»
«CommunicationLink»
«CommunicationLink»
«CommunicationLink»
«SystemInterface»
«SystemInterface»
«SystemInterface»
«SystemInterface»
«SystemInterface»
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Appendix C: Analytic Model Code 
Dim ConfMatrix(6, 6) As Double 
Dim RandCat As Double, TrueCat As Single, Detect As Single 
Dim SysCat1, SysCat2, SysCat3, SysCat4, SysCat5, SysParam1, SysParam2 
Dim NumFalseAlarms, NumFaults, NumFaultsDetected, NumIncorrectDeclared 
Dim ProbAlarm, ProbDetect, ProbDiagnostic, MissionSuccessOld, MissionSuccessNew 
Dim MissionLength, MaintLength, MonteCarloNum, Lifetime, NumMissions 
Dim Results() As Integer, SumTotal(8) As Integer 
 
Sub UserForm_Start() 
 
UserForm1.Show 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub MonteCarloSim(flag As Boolean) 
 
If flag = False Then 
    With Worksheets("HiddenCM") 
        For i = 1 To 6 
            For j = 1 To 6 
                ConfMatrix(i, j) = .Cells(7 + i, 2 + j).Value 
            Next j 
        Next i 
    End With 
End If 
 
Worksheets("Calculations").Activate 
 
ReDim Results(MonteCarloNum, 8) 
For i = 1 To 8 
    SumTotal(i) = 0 
Next i 
 
'Run simulation 
With Worksheets("Calculations") 
 
    Application.Goto .Range("A1:P38") 
    ActiveWindow.Zoom = True 
    .Cells(5, 13).Select 
 
    'Populate Calculation page 
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    .Cells(4, 2).Value = ProbDetect 
    .Cells(5, 2).Value = ProbAlarm 
    .Cells(6, 2).Value = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(4, 5).Value = SysCat1 
    .Cells(5, 5).Value = SysCat2 
    .Cells(6, 5).Value = SysCat3 
    .Cells(7, 5).Value = SysCat4 
    .Cells(8, 5).Value = SysCat5 
    .Cells(3, 11).Value = MissionLength 
    .Cells(4, 11).Value = NumMissions 
    .Cells(5, 11).Value = MaintLength 
    .Cells(6, 11).Value = Lifetime 
    .Cells(7, 11).Value = MonteCarloNum 
     
    MaintNum = Int(Lifetime / MaintLength) 
 
    For i = 1 To MonteCarloNum 
                 
        NumFalseAlarms = 0 
        NumFaultsDetected = 0 
        NumFaults = 0 
        NumIncorrectDeclared = 0 
        NumSuccessMsns_Old = 0 
        NumMaint_Old = 0 
        NumSuccessMsns_New = 0 
        NumMaint_New = 0 
                 
        For j = 1 To MaintNum 
                                   
            'System Distribution 
            If UserForm1.SystemDist = "Normal" Then 
                temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.NormInv(Rnd(), SysParam1, 
SysParam2) 
            ElseIf UserForm1.SystemDist = "Lognormal" Then 
                temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.LogInv(Rnd(), SysParam1, 
SysParam2) 
            ElseIf UserForm1.SystemDist = "Weibull" Then 
                temp1 = SysParam1 * (-Log(1 - Rnd())) ^ (1 / SysParam2) 
            Else 'Gamma' 
                temp1 = Application.WorksheetFunction.GammaInv(Rnd(), 
SysParam1, SysParam2) 
            End If 
            tempHours = 0 
            NumFaults_temp = 0 
            NumFalseAlarms_temp = 0 
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            NumFaultsDetected_temp = 0 
            NumIncDecl_temp = 0 
            NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp = 0 
            NumMaint_Old_temp = 0 
            NumSuccessMsns_New_temp = 0 
            NumMaint_New_temp = 0 
            flagX = False 
            flagY = False 
             
              For k = 1 To NumMissions 
                 
                tempHours = tempHours + MissionLength 
                tempRow = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row 
                .Cells(tempRow, 1) = tempHours 
                 
                'Fault Occured 
                If temp1 < tempHours Then 
                    Fail = 1 
                    NumFaults_temp = NumFaults_temp + 1 
                Else 
                    Fail = 0 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 2) = Fail 
         
                Rand1 = Rnd() 
                Rand2 = Rnd() 
                'Detection Prob 
                If Fail = 1 Then 
                    If Rand1 < ProbDetect Then 
                        Detect = 1 
                    Else 
                        Detect = 0 
                    End If 
                Else 
                    If Rand2 < ProbAlarm Then 
                        Detect = 1 
                    Else 
                        Detect = 0 
                    End If 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 3) = Detect 
         
                'False Alarms? Detected Failure? 
                If Fail = 0 And Detect = 1 Then 
                    NumFalseAlarms_temp = NumFalseAlarms_temp + 1 
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                End If 
                If Fail = 1 And Detect = 1 Then 
                    NumFaultsDetected_temp = NumFaultsDetected_temp + 1 
                End If 
                 
                RandCat = Rnd() 
                 
                'True Fault Category 
                If RandCat < SysCat1 Then 
                    TrueCat = 1 * Fail 
                ElseIf RandCat < SysCat2 Then 
                    TrueCat = 2 * Fail 
                ElseIf RandCat < SysCat3 Then 
                    TrueCat = 3 * Fail 
                ElseIf RandCat < SysCat4 Then 
                    TrueCat = 4 * Fail 
                Else 
                    TrueCat = 5 * Fail 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 4) = TrueCat 
         
                'Declared Fault Category 
                DetectCat = DeclareMatrix(RandCat, TrueCat, Detect) 
                                  
                .Cells(tempRow, 4) = TrueCat 
                .Cells(tempRow, 5) = DetectCat 
                 
                'Incorrectly Declared? 
                If TrueCat <> DetectCat Then 
                    NumIncDecl_temp = NumIncDecl_temp + 1 
                End If 
         
                'Mission Success Calculations 
                If DetectCat >= 1 Or TrueCat >= 3 Or flagX = True Then 
                    SuccessMsn = 0 
                Else 
                    SuccessMsn = 1 
                    NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp = NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp + 1 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 7) = SuccessMsn 
             
                If DetectCat >= 4 Or (TrueCat >= 3 And DetectCat <= 2) Or _ 
                        (TrueCat >= 4 And DetectCat = 3) Or TrueCat = 5 _ 
                        Or flagY = True Then 
                    SuccessMsn2 = 0 
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                Else 
                    SuccessMsn2 = 1 
                    NumSuccessMsns_New_temp = NumSuccessMsns_New_temp + 1 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 9) = SuccessMsn2 
             
                'Maintenance Required? 
                If DetectCat >= 1 And DetectCat < 5 Then 
                    MaintRx_Old = 1 
                    NumMaint_Old_temp = NumMaint_Old_temp + 1 
                Else 
                    MaintRx_Old = 0 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 8) = MaintRx_Old 
                 
                If DetectCat >= 2 And DetectCat < 5 Then 
                    MaintRx_New = 1 
                    NumMaint_New_temp = NumMaint_New_temp + 1 
                Else 
                    MaintRx_New = 0 
                End If 
                .Cells(tempRow, 10) = MaintRx_New 
                 
                'Continue on to next mission? 
                If SuccessMsn = 0 Then 
                    .Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Baseline Offline until PM" 
                    flagX = True 
                End If 
                If SuccessMsn2 = 0 Then 
                    .Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Sys w/ISHM Offline until PM" 
                    flagY = True 
                End If 
                If flagX = True And flagY = True Then 
                    k = NumMissions + 1 
                End If 
                If DetectCat = 5 Or TrueCat = 5 Then 
                    k = NumMissions + 1 
                    j = MaintNum + 1 
                    .Cells(tempRow, 11) = "Catastrophic Failure" 
                End If 
             
            Next k 
            tempRow2 = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row 
            .Cells(tempRow2, 1) = "End of Preventative Maintenance Cycle" 
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            'Update Metrics 
            NumFalseAlarms = NumFalseAlarms + NumFalseAlarms_temp 
            NumFaultsDetected = NumFaultsDetected + NumFaultsDetected_temp 
            NumFaults = NumFaults + NumFaults_temp 
            NumIncorrectDeclared = NumIncDecl_temp + NumIncorrectDeclared 
            NumSuccessMsns_Old = NumSuccessMsns_Old + 
NumSuccessMsns_Old_temp 
            NumMaint_Old = NumMaint_Old + NumMaint_Old_temp 
            NumSuccessMsns_New = NumSuccessMsns_New + 
NumSuccessMsns_New_temp 
            NumMaint_New = NumMaint_New + NumMaint_New_temp 
                         
        Next j 
        tempRow3 = Range("A13").End(xlDown).Offset(1).Row 
        .Cells(tempRow3, 1) = "End of Vehicle Lifetime" 
               
        Results(i, 1) = NumSuccessMsns_Old 
        Results(i, 2) = NumMaint_Old 
        Results(i, 3) = NumSuccessMsns_New 
        Results(i, 4) = NumMaint_New 
        Results(i, 5) = NumFaults 
        Results(i, 6) = NumFaultsDetected 
        Results(i, 7) = NumFalseAlarms 
        Results(i, 8) = NumIncorrectDeclared 
               
    Next i 
 
End With 
 
'Output Results 
Worksheets("Results").Activate 
 
With Worksheets("Results") 
    Application.Goto .Range("A1:J30") 
    For i = 1 To MonteCarloNum 
        .Cells(11 + i, 2) = i 
        .Cells(11 + i, 3) = NumMissions * MaintNum 
        For j = 1 To 8 
            .Cells(11 + i, 3 + j) = Results(i, j) 
            SumTotal(j) = SumTotal(j) + Results(i, j) 
        Next j 
    Next i 
    .Cells(2, 5) = MonteCarloNum * NumMissions * MaintNum 
    .Cells(3, 5) = SumTotal(1) 
    .Cells(4, 5) = SumTotal(2) 
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    .Cells(5, 5) = SumTotal(3) 
    .Cells(6, 5) = SumTotal(4) 
End With 
 
End Sub 
 
Function InputCheck() As Boolean 
 
flagInput = True 
 
'Check combobox has selections 
If UserForm1.SystemDist.Value = "" Then 
MsgBox "You have not selected a distribution. Please select a distribution and " 
& _ 
        "run the Monte Carlo simulation again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check Parameter inputs are valid numbers 
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysParam1.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysParam2.Value) = False Then 
    MsgBox "You have either entered a non-numeric value for the system 
parameters" & _ 
        " or left a field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo 
simulation again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Turn parameter inputs into numbers 
SysParam1 = CDec(UserForm1.SysParam1) 
SysParam2 = CDec(UserForm1.SysParam2) 
 
'Check that all numbers are positive 
If SysParam1 < 0 Or SysParam2 < 0 Then 
    MsgBox "You have entered in a negative number, all numbers should be 
positive", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check Failure Properities are valid numbers 
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat1.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat2.Value) = False _ 
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        Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat3.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat4.Value) = False _ 
        Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.SysCat5.Value) = False Then 
    MsgBox "You have entered a non-numeric value for a probability of a failure 
mode occurance or have" & _ 
        " left a field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo 
simulation again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Turn failure inputs into numbers 
SysCat1 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat1) 
SysCat2 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat2) + SysCat1 
SysCat3 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat3) + SysCat2 
SysCat4 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat4) + SysCat3 
SysCat5 = CDec(UserForm1.SysCat5) + SysCat4 
 
'Check Failure Properties are between 0 and 1 
If UserForm1.SysCat1.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat1.Value > 1 Or 
UserForm1.SysCat2.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat2.Value > 1 _ 
        Or UserForm1.SysCat3.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat3.Value > 1 Or 
UserForm1.SysCat4.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat4.Value > 1 _ 
        Or UserForm1.SysCat5.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.SysCat5.Value > 1 Then 
    MsgBox "You have entered a failure propability greater than 1 or less than 0." 
& _ 
        " Please enter a correct probability and run the Monte Carlo simulation 
again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check Failure Properties sum to 1 for each system 
If SysCat5 <> 1 Then 
    MsgBox "The failure properties do not total 1. Please enter a correct probability 
and run the Monte Carlo simulation again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check ISHM Properities are valid numbers 
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value) = False Then 
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    MsgBox "You have entered a non-numeric value for an ISHM property or left a 
field blank. Please enter a numeric value and run the Monte Carlo simulation 
again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check ISHM Properties are between 0 and 1 
If UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value < 0 Or 
UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value < 0 _ 
        Or UserForm1.ProbDetect.Value > 1 Or UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm.Value 
> 1 Or UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic.Value > 1 Then 
    MsgBox "You have entered a failure propability greater than 1 or less than 0 
for an ISHM property" & _ 
    " or left a field blank. Please enter a correct probability and run the Monte 
Carlo simulation again", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Turn ISHM inputs into numbers 
ProbDetect = CDec(UserForm1.ProbDetect) 
ProbAlarm = CDec(UserForm1.ProbFalseAlarm) 
ProbDiagnostic = CDec(UserForm1.ProbDiagnostic) 
 
'Check Monte Carlo inputs are numerical 
If IsNumeric(UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.AverageMissionLength.Value) = False _ 
        Or IsNumeric(UserForm1.MaintLength.Value) = False Or 
IsNumeric(UserForm1.Lifetime.Value) = False Then 
    MsgBox "You have either entered a non-numeric value or left a field blank in 
the Monte Carlo frame. " & _ 
        "Please enter a numeric value.", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Check that inputs are within max and min or positive 
If UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value < 0 Or 
UserForm1.AverageMissionLength.Value < 0 Or UserForm1.Lifetime.Value < 0 
_ 
        Or UserForm1.MonteCarloNum.Value > 500 Or 
UserForm1.MaintLength.Value < 0 Then 
    MsgBox "You have entered a negative number or a number out of range for 
Monte Carlo Simulations. " & _ 
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        "Please enter a valid number.", , "Error" 
    flagInput = False 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
'Turn Monte Carlo Inputs into numbers 
MonteCarloNum = CDec(UserForm1.MonteCarloNum) 
MissionLength = CDec(UserForm1.AverageMissionLength) 
MaintLength = CDec(UserForm1.MaintLength) 
Lifetime = CDec(UserForm1.Lifetime) 
NumMissions = Int(MaintLength / MissionLength) 'Rounds down 
 
InputCheck = flagInput 
 
End Function 
 
Sub ActivateStartPage() 
 
Worksheets("Intro").Activate 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub ViewAssumptions() 
 
Worksheets("Assumptions").Activate 
Application.Goto Worksheets("Assumptions").Range("A1:N30") 
ActiveWindow.Zoom = True 
Worksheets("Assumptions").Cells(1, 1).Select 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub SetUpConfusionMatrix() 
 
'Assumption that any ISHM diagnostic algorithm will be within one category of 
the true category 
 
With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix") 
    .Cells(2, 6) = ProbDiagnostic 
    'Nominal Column 
    .Cells(8, 3) = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(9, 3) = 1 - ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(10, 3) = 0 
    .Cells(11, 3) = 0 
    .Cells(12, 3) = 0 
    .Cells(13, 3) = 0 
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    'Cat 1 Column 
    .Cells(8, 4) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(9, 4) = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(10, 4) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(11, 4) = 0 
    .Cells(12, 4) = 0 
    .Cells(13, 4) = 0 
    'Cat 2 Column 
    .Cells(8, 5) = 0 
    .Cells(9, 5) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(10, 5) = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(11, 5) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(12, 5) = 0 
    .Cells(13, 5) = 0 
    'Cat 3 Column 
    .Cells(8, 6) = 0 
    .Cells(9, 6) = 0 
    .Cells(10, 6) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(11, 6) = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(12, 6) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(13, 6) = 0 
    'Cat 4 Column 
    .Cells(8, 7) = 0 
    .Cells(9, 7) = 0 
    .Cells(10, 7) = 0 
    .Cells(11, 7) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    .Cells(12, 7) = ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(13, 7) = (1 - ProbDiagnostic) / 2 
    'Cat 5 Column 
    .Cells(8, 8) = 0 
    .Cells(9, 8) = 0 
    .Cells(10, 8) = 0 
    .Cells(11, 8) = 0 
    .Cells(12, 8) = 1 - ProbDiagnostic 
    .Cells(13, 8) = ProbDiagnostic 
 
End With 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub ReadConfusionMatrix() 
 
Dim Temp(6) As Double 
flag = True 
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With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix") 
    'Input Check 
    For j = 1 To 6 
        Temp(j) = .Cells(15, 2 + j).Value 
        If Temp(j) <> 1 Then 
            MsgBox "The columns need to add to 1, please reset this matrix", , "Error" 
            flag = False 
            j = 7 
        End If 
    Next j 
End With 
 
If flag = False Then 
    Exit Sub 
Else 
    With Worksheets("HiddenCM") 
        For i = 1 To 6 
            For j = 1 To 6 
                ConfMatrix(i, j) = .Cells(7 + i, 2 + j).Value 
            Next j 
        Next i 
    End With 
     
    Call MonteCarloSim(True) 
End If 
 
End Sub 
 
Function DeclareMatrix(RandCat As Double, TrueCat As Single, Detect As Single) 
 
If Detect = 0 Then 
    DeclareMatrix = 0 
    Exit Function 
End If 
 
If TrueCat = 0 Then 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 1) Then 
            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
ElseIf TrueCat = 1 Then 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 2) Then 
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            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
ElseIf TrueCat = 2 Then 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 3) Then 
            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
ElseIf TrueCat = 3 Then 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 4) Then 
            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
ElseIf TrueCat = 4 Then 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 5) Then 
            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
Else 
    For i = 0 To 5 
        If RandCat < ConfMatrix(i + 1, 6) Then 
            DeclareMatrix = i 
            i = 6 
        End If 
    Next i 
End If 
 
End Function 
 
Sub ClearWorkbook() 
 
With Worksheets("Calculations") 
    .Cells(4, 2).ClearContents 
    .Cells(5, 2).ClearContents 
    .Cells(6, 2).ClearContents 
    .Cells(4, 5).ClearContents 
    .Cells(5, 5).ClearContents 
    .Cells(6, 5).ClearContents 
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    .Cells(7, 5).ClearContents 
    .Cells(8, 5).ClearContents 
    .Cells(3, 11).ClearContents 
    .Cells(4, 11).ClearContents 
    .Cells(5, 11).ClearContents 
    .Cells(6, 11).ClearContents 
    .Cells(7, 11).ClearContents 
    .Cells(3, 14).ClearContents 
    .Cells(4, 14).ClearContents 
    .Cells(5, 14).ClearContents 
    .Cells(6, 14).ClearContents 
    .Cells(4, 16).ClearContents 
    .Cells(4, 17).ClearContents 
    .Cells(8, 16).ClearContents 
    .Cells(8, 17).ClearContents 
    .Range("a15:" & 
.Range("a15").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents 
    .Range("g15:" & 
.Range("g15").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents 
End With 
 
With Worksheets("ConfusionMatrix") 
    .Cells(2, 6).ClearContents 
    .Range("c8:" & 
.Range("c8").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents 
End With 
 
With Worksheets("Results") 
    .Range("E2:" & .Range("E2").End(xlDown).Address).ClearContents 
    .Range("b12:" & 
.Range("b12").End(xlDown).End(xlToRight).Address).ClearContents 
End With 
 
Unload UserForm1 
Worksheets("Intro").Activate 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub ViewCalcPage() 
 
Worksheets("Calculations").Activate 
 
End Sub 
 
Sub ViewResults() 
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Worksheets("Results").Activate 
 
End Sub   
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Appendix D: Design of Experiments Results and Models 
Alias Structure with Main Effects and Low Order Interactions 
 
A = Weibull-Theta 
B = Weibull-Beta 
C = Sensor Quality (c) 
D = Probability of Detection (PD) 
E = P(Fault Category II) 
F = P(Fault Category III) 
G = ISHM Diagnostic Confidence Level (DCL) 
 
I = ABD = ACE = BCF = ABCG 
 
A = A + BD + CE + FG    D = D + AB + CG + EF 
B = B + AD + CF + EG    E = E + AC + BG + DF 
C = C +AE + BF + DG    F = F + BC + AG + DE 
G = G + CD + BE + AF 
 
Initial Experiment Results 
 
The initial experiment results can be found below. The original run order was random; 
however, this data has been sorted to place the center points at the bottom for easier 
analysis. 
 
 
132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Run Response
Weibull - 
theta
Weibull - 
beta Sensor Quality
Prob 
Detection
Prob Fault 
Category II
Prob Fault 
Category III Diagnostic CL
1 33 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1
2 21 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
3 514 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1
4 368 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1
5 526 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1
6 97 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1
7 22 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1
8 613 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
9 82 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1
10 98 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
11 382 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1
12 487 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1
13 414 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1
14 144 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1
15 30 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1
16 166 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
17 85 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1
18 23 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1
19 195 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1
20 330 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1
21 821 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1
22 50 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1
23 25 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1
24 309 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
25 109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The response for each run is the total of the four repeated measurements, as seen below: 
 
 
 
Initial Model Analysis 
 
Using these results, the sum of squares for the factors and their interactions were 
calculated and it was found that Weibull-Theta, Sensor Quality, and PD were significant. 
Due to aliasing, the sum of squares for PD also includes the interaction between Weibull-
Theta and Weibull-Beta; however, since Weibull-Beta is not significant to the model, it 
can be assumed that PD is the true significant factor. 
 
RM - 1 RM - 2 RM - 3 RM - 4 Response
2 6 0 25 33
0 2 15 4 21
13 324 53 124 514
0 49 148 171 368
213 169 100 44 526
10 3 1 83 97
15 5 2 0 22
242 10 69 292 613
21 60 1 0 82
3 23 1 71 98
92 124 11 155 382
45 1 344 97 487
44 163 51 156 414
1 27 108 8 144
5 9 13 3 30
29 0 17 120 166
10 26 2 47 85
2 8 4 9 23
0 50 106 39 195
213 109 2 6 330
149 222 94 356 821
36 6 2 6 50
13 4 7 1 25
45 91 90 83 309
6 3 4 96 109
48 16 8 54 126
13 1 0 7 21
3 3 1 4 11
 
134 
 
Regressing these factors against the test data gave a fairly high coefficient of 
determination (R
2
) value of 0.704 and an F0 value of 13.67 (p-value of less than 0.0001), 
as seen below. These values signified that the model explained most of the variability in 
the data, and further exploration of the individual factors confirmed that they all still 
significantly contributed to the model. 
 
 
Examination of the model residuals did not indicate any normality assumptions were 
violated (no apparent pattern or significant tailing in the variance checks). The Residual 
by Predicted Plot and the Normal Quantile Plot can be seen below. 
 
 
 
Variability of the non-significant factors was also investigated, with the following 
settings to be determined as causing less variance in the results. 
 
Factor 
Best Setting for 
Variability 
Weibull - Beta Either 
P(Fault Category II) High – 0.4 
P(Fault Category III) Either 
DCL Either 
 
The Center Points that were chosen indicated that curvature is present, as seen by a p-
value under 0.05 below. This means the assumption of linearity in the factor effects 
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cannot be maintained and axial points need to be added for further analysis. Curvature 
can be investigated through a central composite design. 
 
 
 
Central Composite Model 
Axial points were then added to the test design to further explore the response surface. 
For a 3-factor experiment, an axial point of 3
0.25
 (0.316) will be used to ensure the design 
is fully rotatable. The new test design settings in natural units can be seen in the table 
below. The remaining test factors will be kept at their low settings except for P(Fault 
Category II), which will be kept high. The axial points will be tested in random order 
with two replications for a total of 18 additional test points and will be added the previous 
test results for re-analysis. 
 
Factor Axial (-1.316) Axial (1.316) 
Weibull-Theta 652 1047 
Sensor Quality 36.8 563 
PD 0.21 0.99 
 
The second experiment results can be seen below: 
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As expected from the results of the curvature analysis, a second-order response surface 
was discovered. There were also some low-order interactions and a main effect (P(Fault 
Category III)) that were found to be newly significant. However, there is clear funneling 
in the residuals, indicating that a transformation of the response variable is necessary. 
 
 
 
Since the funneling is consistent with a Poisson random variable (the variance of y is 
proportional to the regressor), a transformation of y to    is appropriate.  With this 
transformation, the residuals retained a scatter pattern and did not indicate any normality 
assumptions were violated. The new Residual by Predicted Plot and the Normal Quantile 
Plot can be seen below. 
 
Response
Weibull - 
theta
Weibull - 
beta Sensor Quality
Prob 
Detection
Prob Fault 
Category II
Prob Fault 
Category III Diagnostic CL
460 1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
143 -1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
847 0 -1 0 1.316 1 -1 -1
106 0 -1 0 -1.316 1 -1 -1
1186 0 -1 1.316 0 1 -1 -1
63 0 -1 -1.316 0 1 -1 -1
197 1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
55 -1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
586 0 -1 0 1.316 1 -1 -1
0 0 -1 0 -1.316 1 -1 -1
824 0 -1 1.316 0 1 -1 -1
33 0 -1 -1.316 0 1 -1 -1
64 1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
167 -1.316 -1 0 0 1 -1 -1
776 0 -1 0 1.316 1 -1 -1
5 0 -1 0 -1.316 1 -1 -1
1498 0 -1 1.316 0 1 -1 -1
40 0 -1 -1.316 0 1 -1 -1
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The final coded parameter estimates and significant factors and interactions can be seen 
below: 
 
 
 
Regressing these factors against the test data gave a higher coefficient of determination 
(R
2
) value of 0.81 and an F0 value of 16.73 (p-value of less than 0.0001) than the initial 
model, as seen below. This new model also gives a significantly smaller Mean Square 
Error, another indication that this model is a better fit to the data than the initial model. 
 
  
 
The final model equation mapping the response surface in natural values is seen below: 
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From this equation the stationary point is a point of minimum response, clearly visible in 
the figure below. 
 
 
 
While this response surface best illustrates the region were the response is at its 
minimum, or the region where adding ISHM to the UAS baseline would not significantly 
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affect mission success rates, there can be some inferences made about the regions that 
maximize the response. By determining the sensor properties significant and not the only 
ISHM performance characteristic (the Diagnostic Confidence Level), this evaluation 
implies that the benefits or disadvantages of adding ISHM rely primarily on the 
performance of the baseline health management system. Specifically, that ISHM becomes 
more beneficial as the baseline health management system performs worse. 
 
Based on these results, when evaluating whether to add ISHM to a vehicle, decision 
makers should compare the cost and mission benefits of upgrading just the sensors with 
the cost and mission benefits of adding ISHM. The two options have roughly equivalent 
installation labor costs, as each would have to be implemented at the subsystem level (the 
difference being replacing the sensors versus adding a module to an existing sensor), so 
the main comparison would be the cost of the new sensors versus the cost of the ISHM 
technology weighed against the difference in expected mission success rates. 
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